Welcome to my homepage!

I am a Professor of Finance in the Finance Group of Berlin's Humboldt University.

I graduated from the University of Vienna, where I also obtained my "Habilitation" in the year 2007.

From 2007 to 2011, I taught at  at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Vienna and at the Sloan School of Management. In 2011, I moved to Berlin.

I am a Fellow of the European Corporage Governance Institute, and an Associate Faculty of the Vienna Graduate School of Finance.

Research interests and representative contributions:

Finance & product markets:

In this area, a representative contribution is my analysis of the effect of the maturity structure of a firm's debt on its output pricing, i.e. the dynamic limited liability effect. The analysis shows that firms lower their prices prior to an increase in the amount of debt due. They do so in order to increase their exposure to demand shocks. The additional exposure raises the value of the option to default on debt obligations.

Finance & labor markets:

In this area, a recent working paper shows that the risk exposure of a firm's owners and workers depends on the way competing firms respond to productivity shocks by changing the scale of their output. Competitor inflexibility appears to be a risk factor: the sales of firms with more inflexible competitors respond more strongly to aggregate sales shocks. As a consequence, competitor inflexibility also affects the stability of firms' total wage- and dividend-payments. Firms with relatively flexible competitors appear to smoothen both wages and dividends, but an increase in competitor inflexibility is associated with less dividend-smoothing and more wage-smoothing.

Finance & politics:

In this area, a representative contribution is a  paper about government-owned banks' government financing. We analyze government-owned banks' lending to their owners, using data about banks that are all owned by similarly structured local government in a single country (Austria). The analysis yields evidence that such lending was used to transfer revenues from the banks to the governments. Some of the evidence is particularly pronounced in localities where incumbent politicians face significant competition for reelection.