There are, however, several problems with lobby regulation, and its results have been mixed across liberal democracies. One is that regulation often runs up against the right of free speech and the right to petition government, as in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and this restricts the extent of regulation. A second problem is that the public and policymakers, often, are not clear on what the goals of regulation are: Some hope to even up the political playing field, while others want to publicize the actions of lobbying among other goals. A third point is that regulation cannot make hitherto weak groups powerful—only increased resources and political acumen can do that.

The most that regulation can do is to monitor the activities of lobbying organizations and lobbyists and put pressure on them and the policymakers they deal with not to engage in corrupt activities. However extensive regulation is or might become, it will never entirely root out corruption and nefarious activities in lobbying (and politics in general) as long as the stakes are so high, as they often are in many lobbying campaigns, with many peoples’ livelihoods and futures at stake.

**Conclusion**

While lobbying has always existed and probably always will, several recent trends can be detected regarding this most basic of political activities and the lobbyists who perform it. Three are particularly noteworthy and interrelated.

First, since the rise of the third wave of democracy in the mid-1980s, an internationalization or globalization of lobbying techniques has taken place. This is not to say that all the new techniques in the United States are appropriate to all other political systems, but these techniques are often used when expedient around the world. Second, a reduction of the role of the state in many countries, especially in Western Europe, has undermined the neo-corporatist approach to lobbying and increased the level of pluralism. The first two trends have produced what might be considered an “Americanization” of lobbying across advanced liberal democracies and increasingly in developing democracies. However, this is not because these systems are trying to emulate or mimic the U.S. system exhibiting many characteristics of a highly pluralistic lobbying system.

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**Further Readings**


**Local Government**

While intending to give a comprehensive introduction to local government, the entry will largely focus...
on local government systems in Europe in its empirical references. Such focus seems justified and promising for two reasons. For one, it would be feasible, given the limited space, to give an account of local government in a global perspective and coverage. Second, because of the structure and variance which local governments in European countries exhibit they might provide insights into general issues and trends which may well relate and be “extrapolated” to local government developments in other regions of the world. Because a truly comprehensive account of the variations and trends in local governments throughout the world would require far more space than is available here, this entry provides an introduction to local government by focusing on the varieties and differences among local government systems in Europe. Such a review of variations in local governmental structure in European countries can offer insights into general issues and trends, which may then be extrapolated to developments in local government in other regions of the world.

Here, the term local (self-)government, which originated and is used in the English-speaking world, will also be applied to the other countries under consideration. The reader should keep in mind, however, that the variance in country-specific terminology, such as kommunale Selbstverwaltung (local self-administration) in Germany, libre administration (free/autonomous administration) in France, or sälvstyrelse (self-steering) in Sweden, conveys not only linguistic but also the underlying country-specific conceptual and institutional differences.

**Intergovernmental Setting**

A distinction between decentralization and deconcentration should be made with regard to the arrangement and distribution of powers, functions, and responsibilities in the intergovernmental setting. Decentralization is an intrinsically political concept as it revolves around the devolution of powers and responsibilities from the upper government level to a subnational level with democratically elected and politically accountable decision-making and administrative bodies of its own. By contrast, deconcentration is an essentially administrative concept as it aims at transferring administrative functions from an upper to a lower administrative level.

**Regionalization**

Historically, in (unitary) countries, the intergovernmental architecture comprised two levels—the central government and the local government—with the exception of federal states where, historically, an intermediate/regional governmental level has been in place—in the German case, in fact, preceding the creation of the national state.

In recent years, in some hitherto unitary European countries, particularly the larger ones, the intergovernmental setting has been shaped by the formation of regions on the intermediary level—placed between the central government and the existing local government levels. Among continental European countries, the hitherto unitary (Napoleonic) states have shown remarkable variance in the degree of regionalization. The factually most advanced case is Spain where, when democratic government was reestablished after 1978, the regions (comunidades autónomas) were created with significant legislative powers and fiscal resources of their own. In Italy, the regions were given legislative and operative competences to a degree that has been termed quasi-federal. By contrast, in France, where as an element of decentralization in 1982 regions were introduced, it was decided to keep them at a simple, local government status (as a third level of collectivités locales).

The United Kingdom (UK), too, abandoned its path-dependent unitary trajectory in that, in 1998 and 1999, Scotland and Wales gained regional status (with elected regional assemblies of their own). Currently, however, the UK has also entered the “road towards quasi-federalism” (David Wilson & Chris Game, 2006), which has remained “asymmetrical,” though, as with England (which has 85% of the UK population), remaining (highly) centralized.

Whereas regionalization, particularly in its quasi-federal nuances, has strengthened the democratic as well as the operative potential of the intermediate/regional level, its implications for the local government levels have been somewhat problematic. The politically and functionally empowered regional level, while proclaiming decentralism vis-à-vis the central government level, may be disposed to take a centralist posture in relation to the local government levels. The somewhat hierarchical influence, which in Germany’s federal system the regional states (Länder) tend to exercise over the local level, hints at a paradox of decentralization.
Similarly Spain’s regions (*comunidades autónomas*) have exhibited some dominant stand vis-à-vis the country’s local level.

**Local Government Level**

In most countries, the local government levels are historically made up of two tiers, called, for instance, *counties and boroughs or districts* in the UK, *Kreise and Gemeinden/Städte* in Germany, *départements and communes* in France, and *landsting kommuner and kommuner* in Sweden. In the following, the terms *counties* and *municipalities* will be generally applied.

In some countries (single tier) local authorities have been formed, which combine municipal and county responsibilities. The German–Austrian local government tradition has long since known such single-tier local authorities (called county free cities, *kreisfreie Städte*) as the organizational base particularly of larger cities. Similarly, in the English local government tradition, the scheme of single-tier county boroughs was in place until 1972 and was resumed, under the new label *unitary authorities*, particularly since the 1990s; by now, in most urban areas, including the major cities, single-tier unitaries have been formed. In central Eastern European countries also, such as in Poland and Hungary, the concept of single-tier local authorities has been put to work.

**Intercommunal Bodies**

In countries in which, in the absence of territorial reforms, the territorial structure is marked by a multitude of small-scale municipalities, an additional layer of intercommunal bodies has been created or has come into existence, which are meant to provide the institutional frame and encouragement for intercommunal cooperation.

**Territorial Organization**

The European countries show a conspicuous variance in the average size of their municipalities. On one end of the continuum, there is a group of countries with municipalities with populations averaging more than 30,000, such as the UK (with an average size of 139,000 inhabitants), Denmark (with 55,000), and Sweden (with 31,000). At the other end, there are countries with municipalities having average populations of less than 10,000, particularly France (1,720), Hungary (3,170), Spain (5,400), and Italy (7,200) (see Dexia, 2008, p. 41).

**Territorial Reforms**

The current territorial structure of municipalities largely depends on whether the countries have, in the past, carried out territorial reform and on the underlying political and cultural factors that shaped the decision to carry out or not to carry out territorial reforms.

In the first group of countries, particularly during the 1960s and 1970s, territorial reforms were guided and driven by the goal, typical of the (rationalist) zeitgeist of that period, of massively redrawing the historically small-size boundaries of the municipalities in order to modernize them and make them administratively more amenable and operationally more effective in conducting the multiple tasks conveyed on the local government level by the (then expansive Welfare) State. Labeled by Alan Norton (1994) as the “North European pattern,” in view of the countries in question, this reform strategy was marked by the political determination of the governments concerned to carry out the reforms, possibly against the will of and in the face of protests by the local population, using coercive parliamentary legislation as a last resort. According to John Stewart (2000), particularly in England, the scale of amalgamation has been criticized as being oversized (“sizeism”), fostering political alienation of local citizens (as shown by the low voter turnout).

In other countries (with small municipalities), no territorial reforms have occurred. In France and Italy, in the early 1970s, the national governments attempted, in line with the zeitgeist of the era, to territorially reform the small municipalities (in the French case averaging 1,700 inhabitants). Yet these reform moves almost entirely failed because the governments, adhering to the country’s political culture value of “voluntariness,” made amalgamation contingent on the approval of the local population, and such a local consensus was not reached.

In Central East European countries (and similarly in East German Länder), after the downfall of the Communist regimes, most postsocialist governments decided to do without amalgamation of the small municipalities in order not to impair the newly created (small) local democracies (in
Hungary, the number of municipalities even jumped after 1990, from 1,600 to 3,170).

**Intercommunal Bodies (Inter-Communalité)**

In countries in which territorial reforms of the municipal level did not come to pass, different strategies and approaches were followed to institutionally encourage and enable the multitude of small-scale municipalities to engage in intercommunal cooperation, for instance, in the provision of services for the local population. Against the background of the very small size and very large number of municipalities (communes), France, not surprisingly, was the first and exemplary country to create the legal framework—the first as early as 1890—for a great number of such intercommunal bodies, called *inter-communalité*, at first in the form of *syndicats*, then, since the 1960s, in the form of communal unions (*communautés*), with the most important ones being the *communautés urbaines* (in the meantime) in 16 metropolitan areas. As a crucial institutional innovation, the communal unions have been provided with a taxing power of their own (*fiscalité propre*). In line with the traditional principle of voluntariness (*voluntariat*), most of these intercommunal bodies have been formed on a voluntary basis. In other countries (without territorial reforms), similar institutional developments have got under way, for instance, in Italy (with the formation of *consorzi*, in part by binding legislation) and in some German Länder (with the establishment of *Verwaltungsgemeinschaften* [administrative unions], formed also, last resort, by binding legislation). Most recently, a new round of territorial consolidation has gained momentum. Further, on the one hand, quite massive territorial amalgamation strategies have been inaugurated, such as in Denmark (2007) and Lithuania, both arriving at municipalities averaging 55,000 inhabitants. On the other hand, political initiatives have been undertaken to further consolidate the intercommunal networks.

**Political Institutions**

**Local Democracy**

Local self-government hinges on the idea and imperative that the local citizens govern themselves in all matters relevant to their local community. In its purest form, local self-government is realized through institutions of direct democracy when the local citizens meet directly to make the relevant decisions. In Europe, the mother country of direct local democracy still is Switzerland, where in some cantons, and even in major cities, citizens meet periodically to make relevant decisions, including those on local taxation. For the rest, in all other European countries, the institutions and procedures of representative democracy prevail, according to which the key political right of citizens is to elect the local councilors, while the elected local council is the supreme and sole local decision-making body.

Political parties made their entry into local politics quite late, when national parties discovered the local level as a relevant political arena to mobilize political support and to recruit political leaders. Recently, however, as noted by Marion Reiser and Everhard Holtmann (2008), there are indications of a “farewell to the party model” in local politics.

In recent years, the dominance of representative local democracy and preponderance of the elected local council as the prime local decision maker has been challenged as, since the 1990s, in a number of countries (such as Germany and Italy), binding local referendums have been introduced as a complement and corrective to the elected local councils. Significant impulses came from Central Eastern European countries (including East German Länder) when, after the collapse of the communist systems, the introduction of direct democratic procedures were seen as a crucial step to move toward reestablishing and reinforcing democratic systems.

**Local Political Systems**

Among the local institutional arrangements in European countries, two systems can historically be distinguished. For one, essentially in the UK and in Scandinavian countries, monistic local government systems have developed in which decision making (as well the direction of local administration) is ideally the collective responsibility of the elected council, which, in turn, has delegated this monistic responsibility to sector committees (government by committees). From this followed the notion that the executive function (which combines
decision making and executive functions) should be entrusted to (sectoral) committees formed by the (plenary) council (government by committee).

This monistic government by committee system is contrasted with the dualistic local government system, which has emerged in Continental European countries. It is premised on the (dualistic) distinction made between the local council as the prime local (local parliament type) decision-making body, on the one hand, and as an executive body with, as a rule, a mayor elected by the council, on the other hand, in a division-of-function scheme reminiscent of a (local) parliamentary system. In most countries, the mayor was elected by the council. Both local government “families” have seen significant institutional changes in recent years, which were triggered by mounting criticism.

In the UK, the traditional government-by-committee system was attacked for lacking clearly identifiable accountability and for fostering policy fragmentation. The Local Government Act of 2000 provided for a reform that was undertaken in England and is the option chosen by most councils. It amounts to a kind of “parliamentarization” of the local government system, in that most of the decision-making and executive powers are transferred to one of the committees (the “executive committee” with “executive councilors” as the local “parliamentary cabinet”); there is a (council elected) leader of the committee who serves as a kind of local “prime minister,” while the plenary of the council and its councilors are assigned a scrutinizing function. Sweden, too, has moved toward a quasi parliamentarization of the local government system, stopping short, however, of abandoning the collective responsibility of sector committees.

In continental European countries, the existing dualistic system, with a council-elected executive mayor, was chiefly criticized for constraining the emergence of a local leadership and also because the mayor lacked democratic accountability. Since the 1990s, many European countries (German Länder, Italy, central Eastern European countries) have moved toward the direct election of the mayor, which is reminiscent of a local presidential system. To put a political check on the (possibly domineering) mayor, in most German Länder, a procedure to recall the sitting, directly elected mayor by way of local referendum has been installed.

**Functions**

The local government levels have historically taken on an ever-broader multifunctional profile as local authorities, responding to mounting social and infrastructural needs, assumed responsibility for social services and public utilities (water, sewage, energy, etc.) in what conservatives sneered at as municipal socialism and which in fact amounted to a local embryonic version of the emergent welfare state. With the advances of national welfare states, which climaxed after 1945 well into the 1970s, local government levels were increasingly put in charge by central governments to implement national welfare state and interventionist policies.

In all countries, the local government levels have been responsible for the provision of social services, urban planning, and for the provision of utilities. Moreover, the concern for cultural and recreational matters ranked high on the local government agenda.

The most important intercountry functional variations are related to education and health services. While, for instance, in Sweden and England, the running of (primary and secondary) schools falls under the operational and financial responsibility of the local government levels, in continental European countries, education, by tradition, is firmly a state matter. In some countries, the local government levels (in Scandinavian countries) or the regions (in Italy) are operationally and financially involved in the public health system. Recently, in reaction to neoliberal (lean state) and marketization demands as well under budgetary pressure, the traditional public sector model and with it the multifunctional municipal sector profile have experienced significant retrenchment and cutbacks both in functions and in personnel, thus putting the traditional local government model at stake (see below).

The significant, in part preponderant, functional weight that the subnational levels, particularly the local government levels, have so far acquired in the respective countries is indicated by the high proportion of personnel at these levels compared with the total number of public sector personnel.

Among the unitary countries, the list is topped by Scandinavian countries, with local government personnel constituting up to 83% (in the case of Sweden) of the total number of public sector
employees (see Dexia, 2008, p. 64), and also by some Central East European countries (such as Hungary with 65%) and by the UK (with 56%). The percentage of state personnel is correspondingly small (e.g., 17% in Sweden). While in France the percentage of local government personnel has expanded (to 30%) since the beginning of decentralization in 1982, the share of state personnel continues to be surprisingly strong (some 50% with another 20% in public hospitals). In Italy, the central state continues, despite the decentralization since the 1990s, to employ 58% of the total public sector. Thus, notwithstanding decentralization in these two countries, the central state, hinting at some path-dependent continuity of the Napoleonic state tradition, continues to be organizationally present at the subnational levels.

The picture in federal or quasi-federal countries is somewhat more complex. While in Germany the portion of federal personnel is just 12% and in Spain 23% and the rest are employed by the subnational levels, the lion’s share of public sector personnel is employed at the federal (53% in Germany) or the quasi-federal/regional levels (50% in Spain), with the local levels also showing considerable personnel strength (e.g., with 30% in Germany).

Local Finances

The status and standing of the local government in the intergovernmental setting essentially depends, of course, on the degree of its financial and budgetary autonomy. A valid indicator of this could be the degree to which local authorities, in order to cover their expenditures, may draw on local taxes of their own as opposed to relying on grants assigned to them at the state level. Historically, the local governments financed their spending almost entirely from local taxes, the “rate” levied by English local authorities being a classical example. Signaling the current fiscal dependence of local authorities is the fall in percentage of “own” tax revenues as compared with the entire local revenues in most countries. Sweden is a lone exception, in that 67% of their local revenues still come from the local (income) tax; France and Denmark are also remarkably close, with 49%. By contrast, in most other countries, the self-financing local tax margin is less than 20% (see the table in Dexia, 2008, p. 97). Correspondingly, the share of government grants (which can quite easily be changed and manipulated and could also come with strings attached) from the central government has conspicuously risen, standing, for instance, at 49% in the UK and 47% in Italy and Poland.

Local Organizational Structures

Local Administration: Organization and Personnel

Historically, in preindustrial times and in rural contexts, local matters were, as a rule, attended out by “laymen,” that is, by the local citizens at large in what literally was local self-administration. The layman practice in local administration was pursued, for instance, in Sweden well into the early 20th century and still exists in Switzerland in certain forms.

However, in countries that underwent early industrialization and urbanization, such as in the UK, an industrial front-runner, and somewhat later in Germany, the local authorities built up regular administrative structures with professionalized staff. In continental European countries, within a state tradition geared to legal, rule-bound hierarchical administration (often identified as the Max Weber bureaucracy model), local administration also showed a Weberian stance. Reflecting the advanced welfare state and its public sector-centered implementation model in some countries, such as in the UK and in Sweden, social services came to be almost entirely rendered (in-house) by public—that is, local government—personnel. In some countries, for instance, in Germany and Italy, traditionally following a subsidiarity principle, social services continued to be provided largely by nonprofit, nonprofit organizations.

Spearheaded by new public management (NPM) concepts, the Weberian model of legal, rule-bound hierarchical public administration was criticized for its inherent inflexibility and its neglect of economic efficiency and was sought to be replaced with managerialist concepts and instruments that, borrowed from the private business sector, aimed at making municipal administration and its personnel more flexible and more cost conscious. The impact that the NPM message had on the administrative world varied from country to country, depending on country-specific cultural and institutional conditions and traditions. It was most
noticeable in English-speaking countries, which, as in their Common Law tradition a legally defined distinction between the public and the private sphere is not made, appeared more receptive to the private sector–derived principles. By contrast, NPM had a more difficult access in most continental European countries, in which, against the backdrop of their Roman Law and Rule of Law (Rechtsstaat) traditions, the traditional administrative model was culturally more firmly entrenched. In retaining elements of the traditional model and in—at the same time—adopting and “translating” NPM concepts, these countries have, in their administrative model, not least in local administration, moved toward what has been called a neo-Weberian model.

Under the combined onslaught of (neoliberal) welfare state critique and budgetary squeeze, local governments in most countries have resorted to making deep cuts in their personnel over the past 15 years. Perhaps the most conspicuous case is Germany where, between 1991 and 2004, the total local government staff was cut by 30% (in East German Länder, it was even higher at 53%) and in the UK by 5%. By contrast, in France, the local government staff increased by 24%, obviously in the wake of decentralization since 1982.

Mounting Interorganizational Pluralization of Single-Purpose Actors

In the (horizontal) interorganizational setting, the traditional multifunctional leading position of local government in the local arena has been challenged through a number of powerful currents, particularly through the neoliberal policy message, through the NPM message (both becoming rampant during the 1980s), and increasingly (since the 1990s) through the market liberalization drive of the European Union.

First, inasmuch as the previously dominant conception of local government as the public sector/municipal sector–centered providers of public services was challenged and shattered, the local authorities proceeded to “outsource” the conduct of local government activities and the provision of public services to outside providers. While outsourcing was not an entirely new concept in local government practice, it gained momentum when, in the 1980s, compulsory competitive tendering became the battle cry of Britain’s Conservative Government under Margaret Thatcher and almost irresistibly spilled over into the modernization agendas in other countries. The provision of social services has subsequently seen a pluralization of providers—public/municipal or semipublic, nonpublic, nonprofit, or, increasingly, private-commercial.

The other important field was the provision of public utilities, which, in some countries, has traditionally been the responsibility of local government and has often been carried out by them in an organizational in-house form. Under the market liberalization pressure, the local authorities have followed two options, which are described below.

First, they turned these activities, in what has been called formal (or organizational) privatization, over to newly created, still municipally owned, but organizationally and financially self-standing corporations. In some cases, such corporatization has been extended to a broad scope of local functions, sometimes with the intention of tailoring the entire administration to a private sector–derived holding (Konzern) scheme. Second, often beset by budgetary needs, the municipalities embarked on substantive (or asset) privatization by selling their local facilities (such as local energy or water companies) to outside providers, mostly of the large national or international corporation kind.

In sum, in the (horizontal) interorganizational setting of the local arena, public tasks, which, in the past, were attended by local government in-house or at arm’s length, have increasingly been taken over by, or outsourced to, local-level actors that operate outside the immediate realm and direct influence of local government in the local arena. They constitute the kind of actor networks that, in the currently dominant social science terminology, have been identified as governance. On the one hand, these local governance actors can be expected to bring their specific—financial, innovative, entrepreneurial, and so on—resources and skills to bear in the local arena. As they are typically single-purpose and specific-interest actors—that characteristically, first of all, seek to fulfill their own organizational goals and benefits possibly to the detriment and at the expense of other actors and their rivaling interests—their basically “private-regarding” action orientation is bound to pose a challenge to the role and mandate of the elected councils to be (ideally) the advocates and
Locke, John

Locke, John (1632–1704)

As the father of modern empiricist epistemology, critic of innate ideas, and theorist of a conception of personal identity still very much in vogue in contemporary philosophy, Locke brings key concepts of constitutionalism and toleration to the modern political lexicon: individual rights and freedoms, the rule of law, the separation of powers and the division between private and public. Political power must justify its acts and choices and must practice the virtue of nonintervention in those areas of social life that possess some sort of internal and autonomous normativity, areas where the law of nature does not require the support of positive law. At the heart of Locke’s political theory lies a contractualist political model that opposes both the divine right of kings and the absolutist ramifications of Thomas Hobbes’s contractualism—a model that reconciles tradition and modernity and addresses both secular and religious concerns.

Between 1689 and 1690, as a troubled period in English history came to a close with the Glorious Revolution and the ascent of William of Orange to the throne, Locke published *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, the *Epistola de tolerantia*, and the *Two Treatises of Government*. In many respects, these three works represent an intellectual program begun nearly 30 years earlier, in his juvenile manuscripts on the law of nature—a