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## **Justice Evaluation and the Welfare State in Europe**

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## **Abstract**

Issues of social justice are gaining importance nowadays. They make people ask questions about the social conditions they live in and about the justness of society in general. The welfare state as an institution which incorporates and transports ideas about justice is an important objective behind individual perceptions and justice beliefs. My presentation uses the typology of welfare states suggested by Esping-Andersen (1990) to analyze justice beliefs related to income. Welfare state regimes are characterized by particular ways of allocating goods and life chances and are thus likely to affect the justice beliefs of those who are ruled by these regimes. Building on the welfare state typology of Esping-Andersen, hypotheses are developed of how certain welfare regimes develop support for particular justice beliefs and the justice evaluation of income. Using data of the "International Social Survey Programme" (ISSP) 1987 and 1992 and the "International Social Justice Project" (ISJP) 1991 and 1996 these hypotheses are tested for the United States and a number of European countries. In particular, I focus on whether respondents' characteristics or regime types are more important for explaining the preferences for justice beliefs and the perception of justice of income. Results suggest that liberal welfare states are more likely to support an individualistic justice ideology while social democratic welfare states evoke egalitarianism. In liberal welfare states thirdly the perceived absolute amount of injustice (i.e. adding the absolute justice evaluations of a high or low ranking occupational position) is larger than in social democratic welfare states. The results also suggest that in liberal welfare states the large perceived amount of injustice is supplemented by an individualistic ideology, while in social democratic welfare states the perceived justice gap is framed by an egalitarian ideology.

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## I. Introduction

For quite some time now the European Union has been seeking new ways to set up a common European social policy. Although a far-reaching economic and political integration of the member states of the European Union has taken place in the last decades, an equally significant social integration is still waiting to be carried out. Therefore some of those in charge of power are inclined to favor the strengthening of the social column of the European Union to make further steps towards a deeper integration of the European member states by formulating and coordinating common goals of social policy. Although there does not seem to be a lot of pressure on European national governments to develop a common single European social policy and notwithstanding the fact that a lot of structural, technical and institutional problems seem to discourage national governments to engage more strongly in European social policy, people in charge of power feel that - no matter how - social policy should play a more important role in the future of the European Union.<sup>1</sup>

Looking from a fairly high level of observation it is not difficult to recognize a high affinity among European national welfare state systems in relation to others in America, Asia or Australia.<sup>2</sup> But looking closely at the institutional framework of national welfare systems from below we become aware that the "European social model" (Jacques Delors) appears to be much more heterogeneous (Ferrera 1998). Looking from this point of view we discover different welfare state regimes and different welfare cultures in Europe which have to be dealt with if social policy is to play a greater role in the future of Europe.

What I am going to do in this paper is to look at the subjective side of this objective topic. How are people's justice beliefs shaped by their national welfare states? And what conclusions can be drawn from this subjective attitudes and judgements for the setup and development of European social policy? Not only objective institutional and organizational problems have to be considered and dealt with, but also what people think. Analyzing national survey data gives us some impressions about the diversity of opinions of people in the European Union member states on the perception of the justice of their societies and their preference of justice ideologies and principles.

I wish to adress two questions: (1) What amount of injustice do people perceive in their countries at different times? (2) How much activity and responsibility of the government for redistribution do people prefer in their countries at different times? The first question addresses the topic of which income differences are considered as being just and legitimate in various countries of the European Union. The second is a question on the right order in a society and the amount of governmental intervention and activity preferred by the people. Especially for an emerging single European social policy it is important to know to what extent these views of justice are influenced by structural effects on the individual level or culturally determined on country level. Can we find differences in these attitudes and justice beliefs between different groups of people in general (social cleavages), between countries or between different groups of people between countries (interaction effects)? To what extent do general structural effects exist between different subpopulations of countries in total,

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<sup>1</sup> For an excellent overview of actual and possible problems of the European social policy see Leibfried & Pierson (1995, 1996). Berié (1993) provides a good presentation of the historical development of the European social policy. For actual discussions see for example Brusius (1999), Kodré & Leibfried (1999), Kohl (1999), and Vobruba (1999).

<sup>2</sup> European welfare states seem to be quite convergent from this perspective. Therefore this position is called the convergent thesis (Ferrera 1998).

culturally determined effects between countries and different structural effects of subpopulations (social cleavages) between societies?

Before displaying my empirical results I briefly wish to present some theoretical considerations on justice beliefs of people and on the impact of the welfare state in general. Following that I will characterize the welfare state regimes of the countries chosen for these analyses. After formulating central hypotheses I will carry on with empirical remarks on the data set, variable construction and strategies of analysis. Finally, I will present the results and discuss them to draw some general conclusions.

## II. Two Worlds of Justice Analysis

Within empirical sociological justice research<sup>3</sup>, two different modes of justice judgements have to be distinguished. Firstly, one can analyze general justice ideologies or principles people hold for various aspects of their lives (e.g. ideas of just distribution regimes, of the just order of a society etc.). Alternatively, we can examine people's evaluation of specific results of welfare distribution in a society. In the first case we can speak of order-related, in the second of action- or result-related justice research (Wegener 1992, 1998).<sup>4</sup> In other words we can also refer to justice of rewards and justice of principles. To evaluate the distribution of rewards which people or groups in societies get is completely different in comparison to the preference of general distribution principles and ideologies. The difference between both can be illuminated with examples. Result-related justice judgements or the justice of rewards deal with questions like "who gets what?". The benefit of individuals (oneself or others) is at the center of a judgement analysis of the following form: "It is just, if person A gets the reward X." In contrast to this, order-related justice judgements or the justice of principles contain general statements about the just order of a society, for example in the following form: "It is just, if one gets what one needs" or "It is just, if one gets more, if he or she works harder."

In this paper I will examine both modes of justice-articulations empirically by considering the influence of the welfare state as an institution with great impact on people's lives and perceptions of justice. Welfare state regimes are characterized by particular modes of distributing goods and life chances, and are thus likely to affect the justice beliefs of those who live under these regimes. I will compare countries with differing conceptions of welfare states, and evaluate the impact of these different distribution and security regimes. Firstly, I will analyze perceptions of the amount of

<sup>3</sup> The Sciences distinguish between philosophical and empirical approaches to questions of justice. Sociological empirical theories of justice are most adequate to describe and reconstruct the shapes and articulations of justice ideas. From empirical theories we can learn that it does indeed matter what the people think about justice (Swift et al. 1995). In philosophical respect (Cullen 1992) we might think of the grand normative theories of John Rawls' "Theory of Justice" (1979), Michael Walzer's "Spheres of Justice" (1992) and other philosophers such as Nozick (1974), Hayek (1981) or Barry (1989). In considering justice not as something that metaphysically exists, but as something that is socially constructed, we have to consider the lesser known empirical theories of justice, such as the theory of relative deprivation (Runciman 1966), equity theory (Homans 1961), theories of justice principles (Deutsch 1975), status value theory (Berger et al. 1972), the justice function theories (Jasso & Rossi 1977; Alves & Rossi 1978; Jasso 1978; 1980; 1989), the dominant ideology thesis (Abercrombie et al. 1980; 1990), the split consciousness theory (Kluegel & Smith 1986), or the theory of primary and secondary justice ideologies (Wegener & Liebig 1991; 1992). An overview of empirical justice theories is given by Cohen (1986) Wegener (1992) and Liebig (1997). Although philosophical approaches tend to be more widely known, the empirical ones are no less important. In order to obtain maximum insight into the processes which lead to the development of notions of justice and justice evaluations, great effort should be made to combine the two mentioned separate wings of justice theory.

<sup>4</sup> One can also speak of Macro-Justice and Micro-Justice (Brickman et al. 1981).

injustice in a society in respect to the distribution of income.<sup>5</sup> In the second part of this paper, I will focus on the individual preferences of order-related justice ideology, namely the amount of governmental intervention in providing social security and redistribution and the individual effort as a motor of getting ahead in one's life.

The main argument of this paper is that there are not only individual social factors such as gender, age, social class, prestige etc. which determine justice-attitudes, justice ideologies and justice evaluations, but also effects on the macro-level. These macro-level influences can be supported by comparing different countries and explained by pointing out the welfare state as the main institution transporting justice ideas. The importance of the specific shape the welfare state has in these countries is stressed in order to explain the results of order-related and result-related justice judgements of people.

### III. Welfare State and Justice

The term "welfare state" usually refers to those aspects of a political regime which aims at providing *security* regarding the negative consequences of modernity, *equality* regarding the realization of civil, political and social rights of individuals (Haller 1986) and *justice* regarding the distribution of welfare, which is produced collectively. The origin of the welfare state is commonly traced back to the industrial revolution and its negative side effects. Its development reflects a history of reactions to times of crisis (Flora & Heidenheimer 1987). The welfare state is the historical answer to a complex of problems facing industrialized societies trying to achieve greater socioeconomic equality. It is a special form of state intervention which guarantees stability, certainty and reliability, conveying a feeling of trust and safety to the population. The welfare state is a multi-dimensional enterprise with different types of institutionalizations that can be considered. To include all theoretical and empirical aspects, one must look at (1) the goals, tasks, purposes and functions, (2) the institutions and procedures and (3) the historical dimension of the welfare state (Pioch & Vobruba 1995).

As historical political constellations and socioeconomic conditions differ between nations, every country has its own specific welfare state system. By comparing welfare states crossnationally, one can distinguish different types of welfare states and learn from their specific appearance. The interaction between attitudes of individuals and the function and purpose of welfare states is of central importance to this paper.

The historical development of the welfare state has corresponded to a demand to create more justice in a society. But the opinions of how to bring about more justice and what kind of justice should be realized differ *both* between individuals within a society *and* between societies. There are conflicting views as to how to distribute the welfare of a society, how much social inequality in a society is just or even necessary, and what should be done to reduce the social inequality which is judged as being too high. It is not the objective social inequality in different countries that is examined in this paper, but the subjective judgement of the objective and perceived inequality, in other words the individual preference of distributive justice ideologies and the absolute amount of injustice in societies with regard to income.

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<sup>5</sup> The assessment of what is perceived as a fair wage is a crucial issue in modern societies. Income is a central objective, as it determines the wealth of an individual, the attribution of a position within society, the wealth of groups of people etc. Income rewards people for their effort and provides resources with which they can manage their daily lives and which serves their needs. To draw on a functionalist argument, the perception and judgement of the justice of income can therefore be seen as an important indicator for the stability of a society.


#### IV. Conception of Analysis

The relationship between welfare states and justice requires twofold analysis. In the sociological discourse, these aspects are discussed under the headings *structure* and *action* and the relation and interdependence between the two (Giddens 1988). For my topic of *justice and the welfare state*, we can see on the one hand that welfare states can be understood as a collection of varying justice-conceptions which were introduced via political processes over the course of their historical development. Predominant as well as non-dominant justice-attitudes of different periods of time have left their marks in the structure of welfare states. Welfare states are therefore structures which transport justice ideas and convictions. On the other hand, the individual perception of justice is not independent of the structures and contexts in which people live. The welfare state as transporter of justice conceptions is therefore one of many aspects which have an effect on the individual perception and judgement of justice. In this paper, I will emphasize the influence of the welfare state on justice judgements and perceptions.

Generally speaking, the individual perception of justice can be influenced by macro-sociological and micro-sociological factors. On the macro-level, I regard the specific conception of the welfare state as an important factor in determining justice ideas. Others stress the political culture, the economic and social structure of a country (e.g. development of unemployment, income-mobility etc.) and the institutional forces (Haller 1989, 449). One might also find a specific 'dominant ideology' within a country (Abercrombie et al. 1980; 1990) or 'primary' and 'secondary' justice-ideologies (Wegener & Liebig 1991; Liebig & Wegener 1995), which can be motivated by religion and which shape individual judgement within a given society. However, in this paper I wish to present the welfare state as the most interesting and influential factor determining justice attitudes and judgements, because justice ideas of the past are incorporated in its institutional structure and functioning. Regarding the micro-level, the position of an individual within the dimensions of the social stratification system (e.g. sex, age, religion, education, occupation, income, social status etc.) can explain justice-judgements and justice ideologies. Micro- and macro-level must be taken into account independently in the analysis, but one must also consider the possibility of interaction effects resulting from the ways in which micro- and macro-level are interconnected.

In this paper I want to examine those influences of micro-level and macro-level factors which are most adequately captured in the welfare state. Macro-level effects can be shown by comparing different countries, especially in respect to the specific shape of the welfare state. The countries chosen for investigation differ in the type of welfare state they represent to point out the effects of the specific type of welfare state on the formation of justice ideas. To distinguish between welfare states, I draw on the popular welfare-state-typology of Esping-Andersen (1990), which discusses differences between the liberal, conservative, and social democratic type of welfare state.

In figure 1, the analytical conception of this paper's analysis is shown graphically. One can see the two different types of factors which effect individuals' attitudes towards general justice ideologies on the one side and specific judgements of the amount of injustice in a society on the other side. The expression of justice ideologies as well as the amount of injustice (in respect to income) depends on micro-level factors, which determine the position of an individual in a society, and macro-level factors, pertaining to country culture and the constitution and influence of the welfare state in which people live.

**Figure 1: Micro- and Macro-Effects on Justice Ideologies and the Absolute Amount of Injustice**

In my research I will look at the absolute amount of injustice in a society based on the justice evaluation of the income of people in different professions. While comparing the income of a chairman of a large company to that of an unskilled worker, respondents were asked to judge whether these people are overrewarded, underrewarded or justly rewarded for their respective jobs. Adding the absolute justice evaluation of both occupations based on a high and a low standing occupation gives us the absolute justice evaluation of the whole income spectrum in a society.<sup>6</sup>

Apart from this result-related amount of injustice in a society, there are more general order-related justice ideologies to be analyzed. Justice ideologies are adequate for describing most possible convictions as to how welfare should be distributed in a society (Wegener & Liebig 1992; Wegener 1998). Egalitarianism and individualism are especially important in respect to the welfare state, as they express whether people tend to favor more redistribution or a social structure with greater inequality. In this paper attention is especially drawn to the extent of state intervention in providing more egalitarianism in society through redistribution and more social security.

## V. Typology of Welfare-States

The selection of countries in this analysis is on the one hand the product of the possibilities and restrictions of the data sets. On the other hand, one of the main interests of this analysis is to compare different European countries, mapping the broad range of differences between European countries.

What are the criteria for these differences? On the whole, the chosen countries all have their specific cultural setting. But looking closely, they represent different welfare cultures with all sorts of impacts which arise for that reason. The types of welfare states have a heuristic function in this analysis, as they provide the theoretical background on which different country's effects can be interpreted. They give insight into the major structural principles and cultural convictions of a country.

Welfare states act within market societies and bring in a social element by redistributing resources to ensure the well-being of a whole population. Welfare states do not only work by compensating social grievances through the market, but also through their constitution themselves. The welfare state influences people's lives and life-courses not only through redistributing money and resources but also through its institutional form, through structuring social life prior to any redistribution (Lessenich 1994; 1995, 64). The aim of the welfare state is to provide security, equality (Zapf 1989) and justice

<sup>6</sup> To ask people to judge the income of people in high prestige professions and in low prestige professions provides a measure of the perceived justness of social inequality in a country. The justice of the social inequality structure of a country can be discovered by finding out whether people in different social positions (in the occupational sphere) are overrewarded, underrewarded or justly rewarded.

(Zacher 1989). The question - however - is, what exactly can be described as security, equality and justice?

In comparison with former welfare state typologies (Titmuss 1974; Furniss & Tilton 1977; Korpi 1980; Mishra 1981) the advantage of Esping-Andersen is, that attention is paid not only to the compensative function of the welfare state, but also to the constitutive element (Kohl 1993; Offe 1993). It is more important for Esping-Andersen how, by which criteria, through which institutions, to whom and why distribution through the welfare state is going on, rather than how much is distributed. The policy of a welfare state is therefore important in that it constitutes a special 'distribution-ideology'.

Esping-Andersen regards the specific public-private mix as the institutional setting of welfare-programs. A second concept is 'decommodification', which expresses the extent to which individuals can be made independent from market-forces. And thirdly, each welfare regime has its own characteristic way of structuring sociality, and instituting a certain structure of social inequality (Kohl 1993).

Esping-Andersen distinguishes between liberal, conservative and social democratic welfare states, each of which can be understood as a historically stable macro-structure. In Figure 4 the main aspects and characteristics are combined. For the empirical analysis of this paper I have chosen the United States, Great Britain, Western and Eastern Germany, Austria, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden as representatives for these regimes analyzing data from 1987, 1991, 1992 - 1996 where possible (for an overview see table 1 in the appendix).

**Figure 2: Typology of Welfare States according to Esping-Andersen (1990)**

Regime-Type	Liberal	Conservative	Social Democratic
Attributed Countries	Great Britain, USA	Austria, Eastern and Western Germany, Italy (France, Belgium)	Sweden, Norway, The Netherlands (Denmark, Finland)
	Anglo-Saxon	Continental European	Scandinavian
Central Regulative Idea	Self-responsibility	Status-Hierarchy	Universalism
Decommodification (=Protection Against Market)	low	medium	high
Main Social Structuring Effect	Exclusion	Segmentation	Inclusion

Sources: Esping-Andersen 1990; Kohl 1993; Lessenich 1995.

The *liberal* type of welfare state occurs predominantly in the Anglo-Saxon world and is ideally realized in the United States. The invisible hand of the market rules and provides the welfare of the people. There is a minimum of welfare state institutions, but interventions function according to market-rules. The state considers its main job in stabilizing the market and providing law and order. Social security is taken to lie in the self-responsibility of each individual. The state provides the absolute minimum of social benefits. Allocation and redistribution of goods is done more by the market and less by the state. The extent of decommodification is low. People depend on the market



and its technique of distributing work and rewards. Social stratification is a result of market-processes and their distributive criteria.

The *conservative* type of welfare state can be found mostly in continental European countries. Its form is realized best in Germany. The welfare of the people in this type of state is not universally secure, although state activity is higher than in the liberal type. Social security is preserved through intermediate institutions. The state concentrates on activities backing up the existing status-hierarchy. Participation in the social security system and in social insurances is mandatory. Welfare is provided according to the position in the labour market. The existing status hierarchy is translated into the system of welfare provision. The principle of meritocracy is dominant: only those who are working and contributing to the welfare system can claim its service and support. Social security has to be 'earned' through participation on the labour market. A special assumption of this welfare type is its normative basis. For most situations a 'male breadwinner' exists, providing both the income for the family and the construct of a 'normal-working-relationship' (full-time-job, full social security, special working hours etc.; Mückenberger 1985, 1990). Decommodification depends strongly on one's position on the labour market. Those who do not participate fully on the labour market are either dependent on the male bread-winner or lack full social security. This regime-type favours a segmented labour market and a hierarchically segmented society.

In the *social democratic* welfare model, which can be found mostly in Scandinavian countries (especially in Sweden, Norway), the state takes full responsibility for the social welfare of the people by ensuring a universal minimum standard of living. Each individual has the right to claim social benefits independently of his or her position in the labour force or meritocracy. The state itself provides jobs in the public sector and favours redistribution of money and social services. The degree of decommodification is therefore high, as people get a basic welfare state provision and a basic social security provision independently of their position in the labour force. This type of welfare state tends to equalize social classes and social inequalities.

## VI. Hypotheses

In this analysis I wish to draw attention to the perception of the absolute amount of injustice and the preference of justice ideologies (e.g. etatism and individual effort) in different welfare regimes. I think that the welfare state is the most adequate heuristic background to interpret attitudes of this kind. In my theoretical considerations we have seen that order-related justice ideologies are rooted strongly in the cultures and traditions of societies while the result-related perception of the amount of injustice depends more on structural cleavages and group differences within those societies. Therefore we can expect country differences in the variation of justice ideologies to be major and structural effects within countries to be more dominant in relation to the perception of injustice as in those the self-interest of people is much more stronger than in relation to ideologies. We can formulate the following hypothesis: Order-related justice ideologies are more culturally determined, whereas result-related justice evaluations are more dependent on social cleavages and group differences.

Welfare states are institutions within societies and can be understood as social settings with which people have to live and deal, and to which they must react. They are embedded in specific traditional cultures and shaped according to these cultures. Welfare states as social settings induce specific attitudes of people which are coherent with the dominant culture and contribute to this culture. Justice ideologies (e.g. etatism and individual effort) can be understood as individual reactions to the institutional shape and performance of welfare states. But also the perception of the amount of

injustice in relation to incomes is shaped by the welfare state system, because the extent of income inequality is one of the outcomes of the functioning of welfare states and their way of redistribution. People evaluate the objective inequality climate that has been produced predominantly by the welfare state.

The redistribution in the social democratic welfare regime is high, and people are socially included as much as possible. We could expect etatism to be highly preferred in social democratic welfare states within an egalitarian climate and individual effort to be regarded as of lesser importance. Because the amount of social inequality is rather low we can expect the perception of the amount of injustice to be quite low, too. In liberal welfare regimes, the individual has to care for itself. With some individuals falling through the "social net", there is less political solidarity. As individualism is the dominant feature in liberal welfare states, we expect individual effort to be more strongly preferred and etatism to be preferred least in comparison to other countries. Liberal welfare states generate high social inequality because of their lower level of redistribution. Therefore we expect the perception of a high amount of injustice in this regime type. The conservative welfare state can be characterized by higher social inequality in connection with lesser redistributive power, although it manages to socially include people into the system. Welfare redistribution takes place according to one's own social position and therefore mirrors and reproduces the social hierarchy. The state guarantees that everyone within the same position gets equal income, welfare and security. Therefore we can expect the perception of a high amount of injustice, a high preference of etatism and lower support for individual effort.

Considered theoretically for order-related justice ideologies, every type of welfare state seems to '(re)produce' its own cultural climate on the individual level. Individual justice ideologies can be explained as reactions to specific social settings: here in respect to welfare states, which structure social life and individual perception. They are historically rooted in tradition.<sup>7</sup> The perception of the amount of injustice is also influenced by the concrete welfare outcomes which people evaluate. But here it is expected that structural effects have a much more stronger role in explaining the perception of injustice. This is to say that not only macro-sociological effects (country-effects), but also micro-sociological effects, or structural effects of sociodemographic variables and variables related to various dimensions of the respondent's position in the social stratification system, are expected in the analysis. People with higher social standing, income and education tend to favor less etatism and higher individual effort whereas people with lower social standing, income and education tend to prefer stronger etatism. As welfare states have a great impact on the income structure and the distribution of inequality in a country they structure social life as well as the life of the individuals by providing security, redistributing welfare or mirroring the social hierarchy. Therefore we can expect that people with higher social standing, income and education tend to perceive a lower amount of injustice, whereas people with lower social standing, income, and education tend to perceive higher injustice.

## VII. Research Design

After explaining the theoretical framework of this analyses, some empirical remarks on the data sets, the construction of the dependent and independent variables and the research design follow.

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<sup>7</sup> It is important to note that these ideologies must be considered as the dominant convictions of people, but not their only ones. Other ideologies can also be found in these countries, in different respects (Wegener & Liebig 1993, 1998; Lippl 1998).

## A. Data

The data-basis of this analyses comes on the one hand from two surveys of the *International Social Survey Programme* (ISSP) from 1987 and 1992 and on the other hand from two surveys of the *International Social Justice Project* (ISJP) from 1991 and 1996. The ISSP-surveys take place yearly or every other year in more and more countries. For the purpose of this analysis, the modules 'Social Inequality' (fielded in 1987) and module 'Social Inequality II' (fielded in 1992) are relevant.<sup>8</sup> The ISJP is a crossnational research project on perceptions and judgements of justice in 12 countries in 1991 with a partial replication of the survey in some eastern-european countries in 1996.<sup>9</sup> In this analysis I have used merged trend-data from surveys of both research projects carried out in different western European countries and the United States as reference for comparisons. I restrict my analyses to western European countries and the United States only and concentrate my interest on long-term developments in these countries with a continuous cultural and welfare tradition rather than on the sudden and rapid transformation process in the eastern European countries. For an overview of the countries in the different times chosen see table 1 in the appendix.

In all, there are 28136 cases included in the analysis. Data from Italy 1987, Sweden 1992 and Austria 1992 had to be excluded from parts of the analysis because of missing variables. The data-samples can be taken as representative to the population of people older than 18 years in these countries.

## B. Measurement of Variables

The justice ideologies and the absolute amount of injustice in a society are the main aspects to be analyzed, for this reason they are the dependent variables in this study. As justice ideologies I consider etatism on the equality dimension, which focuses on the amount of redistribution and social security fostered by the national state, and individual effort on the individualistic and meritocratic dimension, conceptualized as a principle for getting ahead in life. These two ideologies are operationalized as factor scores generated by a factor analysis of five items described in appendix table 2. The factor scores were extracted with the principal components method over the joint population of all countries at all times. Separate factor analysis for every country confirms that in all countries and at all times the same factor structure occurs. This means that the structure of these justice ideologies is comparable in all countries as the same items correlate in the same way across national contexts.

The operationalization of the absolute amount of injustice in a society is complex and requires some mathematical calculations. This concept is based on the justice evaluations of the income of different professions (chairman of a large national company and an unskilled manual worker) which have to be explained first. In this respect I draw on the extensive work of Guillermina Jasso and Bernd Wegener (Jasso 1978, 1980, 1989, 1999; Jasso & Wegener 1997), who grounded empirical justice research mathematically by formulating justice judgements in a mathematical equation as the logarithm of the

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<sup>8</sup> For more detailed information of the ISSP-project see Zentralarchiv (1989, 1994).

<sup>9</sup> Participants in the 1991-survey were Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Germany (West and East-Split), Hungary, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Russia, Slovenia, and the United States. In 1996 the survey was repeated especially in the eastern European transformation countries of Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany (East and West), Hungary, the Netherlands and Russia, in order to show the social change of justice-beliefs in new developing democracies. For more information on the ISJP-Project see Klügel et al. (1995) and Christoph et al. (1998).

ratio of the actual reward to the just reward. In this paper, actual and just rewards relate to income. Therefore the equation can be written in the following manner<sup>10</sup>:

$$Justice\ Evaluation_{Income} = \ln \left[ \frac{Actual\ Income}{Just\ Income} \right]$$

When the actual income is judged as being higher than the just income, the justice evaluation has a positive value. If the income of a person or profession is perceived as too high, the person is regarded as overrewarded ( $JE > 0$ ). Similarly, a person is perceived as underrewarded when the amount of the just income is specified higher than the actual income ( $JE < 0$ ). A person is judged as being justly rewarded when the amount of the actual and the just income are the same ( $JE = 0$ ). "The log-ratio form of the justice evaluation function has many good properties. It provides a mapping of the justice evaluation variable onto the full real-number line, with zero representing the point of perfect justice, negative numbers representing unjust underreward (overburden), and positive numbers representing unjust overreward (underburden)" (Jasso & Wegener 1997, 410).

In this paper, non-reflexive judgements of people are analyzed, meaning that these judgements refer to the rewards of others, not of themselves. People were asked to state what they think others in particular professions (chairman or managing director of a large corporation and an unskilled manual worker) actually earn, and then what they should earn (see table 3 in the appendix). The new variables were calculated according to the mathematical equation above. The justice evaluations of the income of a chairman and an unskilled worker covers the whole range of the income spectrum in a society, considering the evaluation of a low-prestige, low-income and a high-prestige, high-income job. Therefore both justice evaluations in combination represent a good measure of the perceived justice or injustice of a society (Jasso 1999). One way of measuring the amount of injustice in a society is to subtract the justice evaluation of an unskilled worker from that of a chairman, as the latter on the average is judged as overrewarded, whereas the unskilled worker is judged as underrewarded. After the calculation one gets a variable which can be interpreted as the justice gap in a given society. A different way is to add the absolute justice evaluations of both professions to get a measure of the absolute amount of injustice in a society:<sup>11</sup>

$$Absolute\ Amount\ of\ Injustice = \left| Justice\ Evaluation_{Chairman} \right| + \left| Justice\ Evaluation_{Unskilled\ Worker} \right|$$

This way of measurement does not specify, whether a person regards the income of a chairman or unskilled worker as underrewarded or overrewarded. It is a measure of distance from the point of perfect justice, without distinguishing between overreward and underreward.

Independent variables include the respondents' sociodemographic variables as well as those variables related to various dimensions of the respondents' standing in the social stratification system. An overview of the measurement of these variables - namely sex, age, income, education, social standing and political views - and of the method of their construction is given in table 4. Sex, education, the occupational status and the country variables are constructed as dummies. Independent variables also

<sup>10</sup> The justice evaluation in the mathematical theory of distributive justice force is a theoretical construction, expressing the observer's *perceived* evaluation of justice. It is transformed into the observer's *expression* of justice evaluation by multiplying the justice-equation above by an error quantity, usually called the expressiveness coefficient  $|\theta|$  (Jasso & Wegener 1997, 411).

<sup>11</sup> Jasso (1999) conceptualized these two different measures as justice indexes and gives useful mathematical information on these, elaborating on their exact properties.

include an attitudinal item containing the individual attitude toward the perception of income inequality in the respective country. It has been more complicated to construct the relational income which is calculated corresponding to the Jasso-justice-equation shown above. The equivalent household income of a respondent was divided through the mean-average equivalent household income in this country and at this time. The newly created variable can be interpreted as the ratio of the respondent's household income to the average household income in this country and time.<sup>12</sup>

### **C. Data Analysis and Research Methods**

First of all, the analysis focusses on the perception of the absolute amount of injustice in the respective societies derived from the justice evaluation of income of a chairman of a large national company and an unskilled manual worker. Regression analyses show the effects of the structural, attitudinal and country variables. Model 1 presents the country/time effects only, model 2 shows the effects of structural and attitudinal variables only, in model 3 the country/time dummies have been substituted by the calculated gini-coefficient in these countries and times (see table 6) and in model 4 country/time dummies and structural variables are included looking at country/time differences and controlling structural effects, in model 5 interaction effects with country/time dummies are tested.

After showing structural, attitudinal and country effects on the perceived amount of injustice in a society, the analyses focus on justice ideologies. As mentioned above, factor analysis is used to extract etatism and individual effort as justice ideologies. The derived factor scores will be regressed on country/time dummies (model 1), various sociodemographic variables and on those related to the position in the stratification system (model 2). After this step, the gini-coefficient (model 3) is included, and substituted with the country/time dummies (model 4). Finally, the country/time interaction effects with structural variables are being tested (model 5) to show specific country differences in the effects of structural variables on the preference of justice ideologies.

## **VIII. Findings and Discussion**

First of all, I wish to present the results of result-related justice judgements of people in the different countries chosen. Here I try to answer the question what amount of injustice people perceive in the different western countries. After that I will concentrate on order-related justice judgements with the question to what extent people prefer general justice ideologies like etatism and state activity in redistribution as opposed to individualistic and meritocratic principles. Subsequently I will look at the perception of the amount of injustice in the different countries. I want to show country differences in the means first and then go on to present a couple of regression analyses.

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<sup>12</sup> The equivalent household income was calculated by dividing the mentioned total household income through the number of people in the household. Each additional person in the household of the respondent was counted by the factor 0,7. There are several advantages of using the household income and this mathematical procedure: There are fewer missing values when using the household income rather than using the job income. The household income for a single person is also a better measure for the social standing of a person because it captures the amount of money a person 'really' has at his or her disposal, since all possible income sources are included. Using the ratio of the equivalent household income to the mean equivalent household income for a given country and time makes it easier to handle problems of different currencies, gross-net differences in some countries, and of different time frames in the questionnaire.

## A. Result-Related Justice: Absolute Amount of Injustice

Looking at tables 7 and 8 in the appendix, we can see the arithmetic means of the justice evaluations of a chairman and an unskilled worker in all countries and at all times and the calculated mean of the respective absolute amount of injustice. The results of the ISJP-data (1991 & 1996) and ISSP-data (1987 & 1992) are presented separately, since they cannot be compared directly: they have been measured in a slightly different manner and one has to take possible survey context effects into account.<sup>13</sup> In these tables the countries are listed according to their objective amount of inequality, their type of welfare state and their ideological culture (redistributive versus individualistic). Looking at the absolute amount of injustice, we can see that the amount of injustice is generally larger in countries with a higher social inequality and with a traditional culture of individualism (United States & Great Britain; left hand side) and much smaller in traditionally redistributive countries with greater state activity and lower social inequality (like the Netherlands, Italy, Norway, Sweden; right hand side). Slightly exceptional are both Eastern and Western Germany as well as Austria, where people perceive a much higher amount of injustice as the actual objective inequality in comparison with other countries would suggest. From the first glance at this country and time means of the absolute amount of injustice we can see that there are obviously country differences. This makes sense considering the different cultures and welfare systems of these countries. But are there still country differences if we control the structural variables?

In table 9 we can see the numerical results of the empirical regression analysis on the absolute amount of injustice. ISSP (left hand side) and ISJP results (right hand side) have been calculated separately for measurement reasons. Reference category are the United States 1987 for ISSP-data and the United States 1991 for ISJP-data.

Now I wish to describe and discuss some highlights: In model 1 we can see the country/time differences in simply another form than the one we have seen before when looking at the country means. Again we can see that in countries with higher social inequality and individualistic (welfare) culture the absolute amount of injustice is perceived as higher than in countries with an etatistic and redistributive (welfare) culture. Those country/time effects alone explain between 4% (ISJP) and 6% (ISSP) of the variance.

In model 2 only the structural effects are being tested. Here we find similar effects, as we find it for the perception of the justice evaluations of income of a chairman and an unskilled worker (see for example Lippl 1998, Verwiebe 1999). Women tend to perceive a lesser amount of injustice in society than men, although this effect is significant in the ISJP-data only. Considering age, we can see that elder people tend to perceive a higher amount of injustice, this effect is significant in the ISSP-data only. An interesting outcome is that the most important objective indicators of one's own social status (education and relational income) have no stable effect. If we don't control for the objective inequality in one's country, people with higher income tend to perceive a smaller amount of injustice. This is what one would expect if we took the self-interest of people into account, since people with a higher social standing profit from a high amount of inequality and injustice in a society. These effects can be explained by the respondents' self-interest to guard their social status and wealth, which they try to legitimate by playing down the amount of injustice in society. Of course we can find the same effect if we look at the subjective perception of one's own social standing, which has an even distinct effect.

<sup>13</sup> In the ISSP, the actual and the just income of people in 11 different professions was asked (among these the incomes of a chairman and an unskilled worker) while in the ISJP only the incomes of a chairman and an unskilled worker were inquired.

People with a higher social standing tend to perceive the amount of injustice as smaller than those with a lesser social standing. But if you do control for objective social inequality (as in model 3), people with higher relational income perceive a larger justice gap (this is only so in the ISSP-data). This gives rise to the assumption that there might be interaction effects with the country/time dummies. Looking at the education variable, we find opposite effects in the ISSP-data in comparison to the ISJP-data. In the ISSP-data, the better educated people perceive a higher amount of injustice in a society, whereas they perceive a smaller amount in the ISJP-data.<sup>14</sup> Looking at the occupational status of being self-employed we find no significant effect on the amount of injustice.

One could imagine that all variables describing the social position of an individual might have an effect, since self interest and rational thoughts should explain the extent of one's perception of the justness of a society. If a better standing and well educated person judges a society as less unjust, one's own high social standing and rewards are legitimated. The argument counts for all sorts of different variables which measure the social position of a person. The unemployed and others at the bottom end of the system perceive society as a lot unjust. They have to bear the burden of high social inequality, as they sit at the bottom of the hierarchy, or fall completely out of the working system and have to rely on the state benefits to survive. The assumption that left-wing people look upon society as much more unjust than conservatives and right-wing people is confirmed by the results (see also Kelley & Evans 1993). Those oriented towards the political left favor egalitarianism and therefore propose lower social inequality for political reasons (Lippl 1998). This is also the case for people who perceive a higher amount of objective inequality in a society. Of course they also perceive a higher injustice of society.

In model 3 the gini-coefficient is brought in, substituting the country/time dummies. Again the results are not surprising: The higher the objective social inequality measured with the gini-coefficient, the higher is the injustice of the society which people perceive in their country. By adding the gini coefficient the explained variance rises to 7% in the ISSP-data and to 9% in the ISJP-data and improves the regression model significantly.

In model 4 the gini-coefficient is substituted by the country/time dummies. We can see that even if we control for structural effects, the usual effect of the countries and times remain stable. By doing this, the fit can be improved significantly in both data sets (12% in the ISSP and 11% in the ISJP). People in countries with an individualistic and less redistributive welfare culture and higher social inequality perceive a higher amount of injustice than people in more distributive countries with lower objective social inequality.

In model 5 (see table 11 and 12), the country-effects are shown, controlled for interaction effects with structural variables. Controlling for interaction effects (group differences between countries) is a new and still not that developed enterprise in comparative research and the discussion of attitudes on regimes of welfare states (Svallfors 1997). Here we can study the influence of long-term countryspecific welfare cultures as well as traditions of country-specific group cleavages. In model 5 the fit can be improved significantly by adding interaction effects into the regression model. Looking at the country influence, what we can see is that the effects of the countries disappear in this model. Interaction effects wipe out cultural differences of whole countries and explain more than country-differences on their own. If we look closer at these countryspecific effects of structural variables, we find that especially the attitudes of highly educated, unemployed and left-wing people between countries explain most of the variance of the perception of the absolute amount of injustice in a

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<sup>14</sup> Education in the ISSP-data is not originally collected as Casmin-categories (see table 4). This effect might be the result of a measurement problem rather than a serious difference and a true effect.

society. In the ISSP-data, the highly educated people in Western and Eastern Germany perceive a lesser amount of injustice in comparison with the United States 1987 while in the ISJP-data the highly educated in the Netherlands perceive a higher amount of injustice in their society in comparison to the United States 1991. In the ISSP-data, the unemployed in all countries perceive a smaller amount of injustice, or - in other words - the unemployed in the United States 1987 perceive a higher amount of injustice in comparison to all other countries. Especially the unemployed in the Netherlands perceive less injustice in the society, since they can be counted as one of the winners of the Netherlands' welfare state in 1987 which provided around 80% of the last wage as unemployment benefit during that time (Heinze et al. 1999). Regarding the political views of people we can see that especially in liberal welfare states and individualistic societies with a high amount of income inequality and in the Netherlands the people oriented towards the left perceive a higher amount of injustice. For the United States and Great Britain we can interpret this as a sign of a growing dissatisfaction with the republican or conservative governments during that time, where people were expected to rely on themselves in a liberal and individualistic atmosphere. In the Netherlands we can interpret this effect of the left-wing people probably as a attitudinal motor of rebuilding the Netherlands' welfare state in a time of crisis during a period of the great coalition between the christian democratic and the socialdemocratic party (Heinze et al 1999).

## **B. Order-Related Justice: Etatism and Individual Effort**

After presenting the results of the perception of the absolute amount of injustice in various countries let us now look at order-related justice ideologies. Firstly, I will draw attention to the views on government responsibility in various fields of providing social security and redistribution (see table 10). In model 1, again we can see country differences only. Considering the three different welfare cultures and regime types we do not find a perfect fit of regime type and extent of etatism but generally a pattern which fits into our hypotheses. In liberal welfare cultures, people prefer less activity by the government. In conservative welfare states, etatism is relatively high, although it is highest in socialdemocratic countries like Norway. Italy and Eastern Germany turn out to be an exception where etatism is highly preferred. In Eastern Germany the high preference of state activity is probably an effect of the long historical tradition of socialism, where people traditionally relied on the state as an overall organizer and planner of their lives.

In model 2 we can find the results of structural variables only. We can see that women tend to be more etatistic than men. This finding can be interpreted by the impact of welfare states and with arguments of socialization. In most cases, women are more dependent on the (welfare) state, on redistribution and social security provision than men. They are in precarious labor market positions and are therefore dependent on either the male bread winner or/and the state. And women prefer higher etatism, because women are more inclined to values of social solidarity and values of caring (Wegener 1995). We can also see that people with a higher income, people with higher education and people who perceive themselves as having a higher social standing tend to be less etatistic. These are obvious effects of social cleavages. The same effect occurs for the self-employed. These effects can be explained through the self-interest of these people who do not benefit directly from a strong redistributive government. They favor low etatism to guard their own social status and wealth.

In model 3 we can see the influence of the objective income inequality (as substitute of the country dummies) on the preference of etatism controlling structural variables. The fit can be improved significantly and the model explains 28% of the variance of etatism. This is one of the puzzling results of this study. The higher the objective income equality the lesser people prefer the activity of the



government to provide social security and redistribution. This is surprising, since one might be inclined to think that people would prefer more state intervention in cases where income inequality is perceived as being too high simply to overcome this situation. But as we see, this is not true for reasons which have to be explained later on in a separate discussion.

In model 4 we find the effects of the country/time dummies controlled for structural effects. These country effects from model 1 remain stable controlling for structural effects. We can see that people in liberal welfare countries with an individualistic culture and a high objective income inequality prefer less etatism than those people in conservative and social democratic welfare regimes. Again Eastern Germany and Italy plays a special role with a high degree of etatism.

In model 5 (see table 13), interaction effects of structural variables with country/time dummies are shown, improving the fit of the model to 40% of explained variance. The first striking result in contrast to the regression model of the amount of injustice in the society is that country/time effects do not disappear through controlling interaction effects - with the exception of the Netherlands, where the country/time effect disappears. In all other countries the effect of the country from model 1 and 4 remains stable. This is a very strong argument for real country-differences relating to the extent of etatism. In social democratic welfare regimes there is nearly as much support of a highly etatistic attitude as in conservative regimes, while the support of etatism in liberal welfare cultures is rather low. The highest degree of etatism in postsocialist Eastern Germany results from the former socialist tradition.

The second striking result is that the country effect of the Netherlands disappears and is probably substituted by interaction effects. In the Netherlands we find that older people and those with higher income are more etatistic than older people and high earners in other countries. Not surprisingly, the same result in respect to age applies to Eastern Germany, where older people tend to be more etatistic because of their socialization through the state socialistic system of the former GDR. They can be characterized as the winners of the transformation process after reunification, because in comparison to the real spending power in Eastern Germany, the Western German welfare state provided a high amount of expenditure on the retired.

The most interesting interaction effects can be found in relation to education. Looking at those respondents with a secondary qualification we can arrive at the conclusion that in general those people tend to be less etatistic than those with a solely primary education. Those with a tertiary higher qualification and an academically-oriented university education tend to be even lesser in favor of etatism than all others. Interaction effects show that those with a secondary education in Western Germany are more strongly etatistic than those in the United States and that those with a secondary education in Austria, Italy and in the Netherlands prefer even more etatism. Interestingly, secondary education has no significant effect in liberal welfare states (United States and Great Britain) and in the social democratic welfare regime of Norway. The strongest preference of etatism of course have the people with a secondary education in Eastern Germany, since they can be characterized as the winners of the new extensive welfare state after reunification. Looking at the highly educated, we can also see that people in the Netherlands are more etatistic than those highly educated in other countries but less etatistic of course than those on the medium and primary educational level.

## Conclusion

From the presented results two different sorts of conclusions can be drawn, the ones for the empirical justice analysis and the others for the welfare state regime discussion in Europe.

As we have seen at the beginning of this paper there are two different worlds of justice analysis. Order-related justice analysis on the one hand deals with ideologies and general principles. Those ideologies are deeply grounded in the cultures and traditions of societies and therefore prevalent for a long time. In the empirical analysis of etatism we have seen that differences between countries in the preference pattern of etatism continue over time and are significant even if interaction effects are controlled. Justice ideologies are indeed deeply rooted in societies. They are part of the culture and not that much structurally determined. Result-related justice analysis on the other hand comprises the evaluation of specific distributions in a society. With the absolute amount of injustice in a society we have found a measure of (in)justice, which is result-related and covers the whole spectrum of the income-continuum. The results show that country differences in the perception of the absolute injustice in a society *remain*, if we control for structural variables but *disappear*, if we add interactions of structural variables with countries in the regression models. These findings give rise to the assumption that result-related justice perceptions are not that determined by the cultural differences of countries but can mostly be explained by the structural effects within each country.

We can now understand why we get the puzzling picture that in liberal welfare states we find a perception of a high amount of injustice in income distribution but a low preference of etatism. The ideology of etatism is culturally determined as a not 'dominant ideology' (Abercrombie et al. 1980, 1990) in liberal welfare regimes, although the amount of injustice is perceived as being very high. Certain people in liberal welfare states (the highly educated, unemployed and left-wing) judge high income inequality as unjust, but etatism in general is preferred less by the public. Although the government's higher responsibility for redistribution and providing social security might compensate the level of high injustice in a society. In social democratic welfare regimes, we find the opposite picture: Etatism is highly preferred and part of the country's culture and the institutionalized welfare state. The perception of the people is that the amount of injustice in their societies is low. In conservative welfare states we can find the perception of a high (ISSP-data) or even very high (ISJP-data) amount of injustice and also a high preference for state responsibility in matters of providing welfare and social security.

**Figure 3: Welfare Regimes and the Two Modes of Justice Evaluations**

	Welfare Regime		
	Liberal	Conservative	Social Democratic
Absolute Amount of Injustice (result-related mode)	high	high	Low
Etatism (order-related mode)	low	high	High

What general conclusions can be drawn for the discussion of European social policy or a European welfare state? The welfare state is an important factor of social integration, providing tools of redistribution to reduce high social inequality. Justice attitudes and their articulations are an important indicator of the degree of social consensus within societies regarding the welfare state (Mau 1997). As

order-related justice ideologies (e.g. etatism) are culturally and traditionally determined in long-term historical processes, it will probably be extremely difficult to create and establish a single European welfare state that is supported and legitimated by people who are used to their specific national welfare states. Peoples' attitudes on the welfare state are formed by the specific shape of the welfare state and vice versa the welfare state is legitimated by these attitudes. This cultural pathdependency in attitudes cannot be broken up easily and makes it rather difficult for a European welfare state to receive a widespread legitimation and to succeed. In contrast, the perception of the absolute amount of injustice can show some of the weak sides of traditional national welfare states. A single European welfare state could probably avoid these if it managed to overcome cleavages and group differences in the justice perception. If a European welfare state is to be established, justice judgements (order- and result-related) must be taken seriously and preferred ideas of justice and their change must have an adequate influence on the radical changes of the people's welfare systems.

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## Appendix:

**Table 1: Countries in the Analysis at Different Times, Data-sets and Cases**

Country	Data	ISSP	ISJP	ISSP	ISJP	Total
	Year	1987	1991	1992	1996	
United States	(USA)	1564	1414	1273		
Great Britain	(GB)	1212	1319	1066		
Western Germany	(WGER)	1397	1837	2297	987	
Eastern Germany	(EGER)		1019	1094	1137	
Austria	(A)	972		1027		
The Netherlands	(NL)	1638	1783		790	
Italy	(I)	1027		996		
Norway	(N)			1538		
Sweden	(S)			749		
Total		7810	7372	10040	2914	28136

**Table 2: Factor Structure of Etatism and Individual Effort**

	Etatism	Individual Effort	$h^2$
The government should provide a job for everyone who wants one.	<b>.612</b>	.095	.383
The government should guarantee everyone a minimum standard of living.	<b>.570</b>	-.037	.326
The government should place an upper limit on the amount of money any one person can make.	<b>.523</b>	.160	.299
Factors which are considered important for getting ahead: ability and talent	-.015	<b>.708</b>	.501
Factors which are considered important for getting ahead: hard work and effort	-.162	<b>.681</b>	.490
Eigenvalue	1.812	1.318	

Principal Components Method  
 No Rotation  
 $h^2$ : Communalities

**Table 3: Dependent Variables: Etatism, Individual Effort and the Absolute Amount of Injustice*****A: Order-related Justice Ideologies***

Etatism	The government should provide a job for everyone who wants one.
	The government should guarantee everyone a minimum standard of living.
	The government should place an upper limit on the amount of money any one person can make.
Individual Effort	Factors which are considered important for getting ahead: ability and talent
	Factors which are considered important for getting ahead: hard work and effort

***B: Result-related Justice Evaluations***

*Actual and Just Job-income of different Professions and Justice Evaluations (Jasso & Wegener 1997)*

Justice Evaluation ( $JE_{\text{Chairman}}$ )	What do you think a chairman or managing director of a large corporation earns per year on average? Actual Income (AI)
	Now tell me what you think a just and fair average yearly income for a chairman or managing director of a large corporation would be? Just Income (JI)
	Calculated by the equation: $JE_{\text{Chairman}} = \ln (AI_{\text{Chairman}} / JI_{\text{Chairman}})$
Justice Evaluation ( $JE_{\text{Unskilled Worker}}$ )	What do you think an unskilled manual worker earns per year on average? Actual Income (AI)
	Now tell me what you think a just and fair average yearly income for an unskilled manual worker would be? Just Income (JI)
	Calculated by the equation: $JE_{\text{Unskilled Worker}} = \ln (AI_{\text{Unskilled Worker}} / JI_{\text{Unskilled Worker}})$

*Justice Index II (Jasso 1999)*

Absolute Amount of Injustice in a Society (AAI)	Calculated by the equation: $AAI =  JE_{\text{Chairman}}  +  JE_{\text{Unskilled Worker}} $
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All items are coded as 5-point-scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree)



**Table 4: Independent Variables**


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Sex	Dummy (Women = 1)
Age	Respondents' age in years
Relational income	Log-ratio of individual equivalent household income to average country equivalent household-income
Education 2	Casmin-Education: Level 2a, 2b and 2c (for further information on the conception of the Casmin-Codings of education see table 5, König et al. 1988, Braun & Müller 1997, Müller & Shavit 1998)
Education 3	Casmin-Education: Level 3a and 3b (for further information on the conception of the Casmin-Codings of education see table 5, König et al. 1988, Braun & Müller 1997, Müller & Shavit 1998)
Self-employed	Full- and part-time, casual work, reduced working hours (Dummy)
Unemployed	(Dummy)
Not in labor force	The retired and the disabled, Housewives and housemen, students at school/college, temporary leave (Dummy)
Own social standing	Respondents were asked to place themselves on a 10-point-scale: 1 = low social standing, 10 = high social standing
Political left	Respondents were asked to place themselves in respect to their political views on a 5-point-scale: 1 = right, 5 = left. If this variable was missing, the voting behavior was used. The political party people would vote for if there was a national election next Sunday was recoded in the right-left-scale.
Judgement of income differences in country	What do you think about the difference in incomes people have in COUNTRY? Are the differences much too large, somewhat too large, about right, somewhat too small, or much too small? (5-point-scale)
Gini-Coefficient	The Gini-Coefficient for every country and all times was calculated from the household income by the stata-procedure 'rsread' (for an overview of the results see table 5 in the appendix)

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**Table 5: Casmin-Education**

Level	Description of Qualification
1a	Less than general (primary) formal education (ISJP 1991/96) This is the social minimum of education. Namely, the minimal level that individuals are expected to have obtained in a society. It generally corresponds to the level of compulsory education (Müller & Shavit 1998)
1b	General (primary) formal education (ISJP 1991/96) 1a und 1b (Müller & Shavit 1998)
1c	General (primary) formal education and basic vocational training (ISJP 1991/96) Basic vocational training above and beyond compulsory schooling (Müller & Shavit 1998)
2a	Medium formal education and medium vocational training (ISJP 1991/96) Advanced vocational training or secondary programmes in which general intermediate schooling is combined by vocational training (Müller & Shavit 1998)
2b	2a and 2b (ISJP 1991/96) Academic or general tracks at the secondary intermediate level (Müller & Shavit 1998)
2c	Secondary formal education (Abitur, maturas) (ISJP 1991/96) Full maturity certificates (e.g. the Abitur, Matriculation, Baccalauréat, A-levels) (Müller & Shavit 1998)
3a	Lower tertiary (vocational) training (ISJP 1991/96) Lower-level tertiary degrees, generally of shorter duration and with a vocational orientation (e.g. technical college diplomas, social worker or non-university teaching certificates) (Müller & Shavit 1998)
3b	Higher tertiary (vocational) training (ISJP 1991/96) The completion of a traditional, academically-oriented university education (Müller & Shavit 1998)

Sources: ISJP1991/96; Müller 1999; Müller & Shavit 1998, 17; Brauns & Steinmann 1997

**Table 6: Gini-Coefficients for Countries in the Analyses in 1987, 1991, 1992 and 1996 Calculated from Household Income**

Country	Data Year	ISSP	ISJP	ISSP	ISJP
		1987	1991	1992	1996
United States (USA)		.397	.425	.407	
Great Britain (GB)		.339	.427	.362	
Western Germany (WGER)		.509	.313	.286	.305
Eastern Germany (EGER)			.287	.257	.262
Austria (A)		.268		.270	
The Netherlands (NL)		.261	.229		.283
Italy (I)		.307		.273	
Norway (N)				.283	
Sweden (S)				—	

Source: ISSP 1987, ISJP 1991, ISSP 1992, ISJP 1996, Own calculations with stata procedure rspread

**Table 7: Means of Justice Evaluations and the Absolute Amount of Injustice in 1991 and 1996**

	United States	Great Britain	Western Germany	Eastern Germany	The Netherlands
1991					
Chairman	.336	.480	.643	.548	.338
Unskilled Worker	-.242	-.292	-.264	-.224	-.216
Absolute Amount of Injustice	.706	.827	.981	.767	.621
1996					
Chairman	—	—	.755	.689	.300
Unskilled Worker	—	—	-.155	-.140	-.150
Absolute Amount of Injustice	—	—	.948	.885	.497

**Table 8: Means of Justice Evaluations and the Absolute Amount of Injustice in 1987 and 1992**

	United States	Great Britain	Western Germany	Eastern Germany	Austria	Italy	The Netherlands	Norway	Sweden
1987									
Chairman	.418	.554	.515	—	.612	—	.357	—	—
Unskilled Worker	-.171	-.185	-.115	—	-.159	—	-.133	—	—
Absolute Amount of Injustice	.816	.799	.709	—	.856	—	.547	—	—
1992									
Chairman	.664	.622	.458	.372	—	.302	—	.355	.301
Unskilled Worker	-.224	-.203	-.178	-.321	—	-.214	—	-.135	-.112
Absolute Amount of Injustice	1.117	.967	.718	.846	—	.550	—	.568	.494

**Table 9: Multiple Regression Analysis of the Absolute Amount of Injustice**

	ISSP				ISJP			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Country &amp; Time</i>								
91:United States								
92:United States	0.304 (11.023)**			0.257 (9.500)**				
87:Great Britain	-0.007 (0.230)			-0.061 (2.159)*				
91:Great Britain					0.128 (3.836)**			0.039 (1.169)
92:Great Britain	0.159 (5.421)**			0.074 (2.541)*				
87:Western Germany	-0.103 (3.811)**			-0.143 (5.115)**				
91:Western Germany					0.287 (9.393)**			0.206 (6.613)**
92:Western Germany	-0.089 (3.630)**			-0.151 (6.122)**				
96:Western Germany					0.247 (6.599)**			0.161 (4.247)**
91:Eastern Germany					0.136 (3.714)**			0.133 (3.562)**
92:Eastern Germany	0.031 (1.074)			-0.147 (5.039)**				
96:Eastern Germany					0.178 (4.862)**			0.098 (2.652)**
87:Austria	0.045 (1.499)			-0.057 (1.885)				
87:The Netherlands	-0.260 (9.729)**			-0.307 (11.370)**				
91:The Netherlands					-0.078 (2.647)**			-0.108 (3.679)**
96:The Netherlands					-0.205 (5.315)**			-0.148 (3.891)**
92:Italy	-0.264 (9.268)**			-0.393 (13.485)**				
92:Norway	-0.244 (9.181)**			-0.303 (11.255)**				
<i>Structural Variables</i>								
Sex (1=women)		-0.003 (0.227)	-0.008 (0.667)	-0.022 (1.810)		-0.056 (3.204)**	-0.059 (3.389)**	-0.055 (3.167)**
Age (in years)		0.002 (3.568)**	0.001 (2.206)*	0.001 (1.269)		0.001 (1.498)	0.001 (1.212)	0.000 (0.750)
Rel. Income		-0.018 (2.500)*	0.024 (3.133)**	-0.006 (0.830)		-0.013 (0.817)	-0.006 (0.380)	-0.031 (1.929)
No Income		-0.061 (2.763)**	-0.018 (0.801)	-0.030 (1.368)		0.124 (4.567)**	0.124 (4.579)**	0.087 (3.206)**
Education (Casmin 2)		0.037 (2.465)*	0.026 (1.730)	-0.002 (0.111)		-0.076 (3.444)**	-0.080 (3.583)**	-0.083 (3.667)**
Education (Casmin 3)		0.025 (1.542)	0.035 (2.186)*	0.069 (4.080)**		-0.099 (4.435)**	-0.107 (4.768)**	-0.056 (2.442)*
Self-Employed		-0.009 (0.429)	-0.007 (0.312)	0.000 (0.023)		-0.055 (1.701)	-0.056 (1.736)	-0.047 (1.468)
Unemployed		0.040 (1.341)	0.066 (2.250)*	0.050 (1.733)		0.155 (3.820)**	0.163 (4.006)**	0.144 (3.551)**
Not in Labor Force		-0.087 (6.081)**	-0.073 (5.162)**	-0.042 (3.004)**		0.055 (2.576)*	0.061 (2.848)**	0.036 (1.703)
Own Social Standing		-0.010 (2.705)**	-0.020 (5.351)**	-0.023 (6.118)**		-0.034 (5.990)**	-0.032 (5.650)**	-0.027 (4.663)**
Political Left		0.050 (6.826)**	0.054 (7.310)**	0.059 (8.154)**		0.071 (7.195)**	0.075 (7.489)**	0.062 (6.259)**
Income Inequality		0.139 (21.354)**	0.149 (22.981)**	0.140 (21.079)**		0.185 (20.091)**	0.184 (19.970)**	0.180 (19.206)**
Gini			1.252 (14.677)**				0.374 (3.132)**	
Constant	0.813 (42.757)**	0.055 (1.159)	-0.326 (6.094)**	0.248 (4.927)**	0.705 (31.361)**	0.046 (0.682)	-0.076 (0.979)	0.026 (0.365)
Observations	12224	12224	12224	12224	8020	8020	8020	8020
R-squared	0.061	0.056	0.072	0.117	0.038	0.086	0.087	0.108

Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses

\* significant at 5% level; \*\* significant at 1% level

**Table 10: Multiple Regression Analyses of Etatism and Individual Effort**

	Etatism				Effort			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Country &amp; Time</i>								
91:United States	-0.026 (0.537)			-0.038 (0.888)	-0.862 (21.270)**			-0.879 (21.508)**
92:United States	0.041 (0.830)			-0.051 (1.172)	-0.141 (3.343)**			-0.173 (4.091)**
87:Great Britain	0.849 (16.810)**			0.691 (15.411)**	-0.002 (0.040)			-0.024 (0.555)
91:Great Britain	1.066 (21.689)**			0.791 (18.127)**	-1.008 (24.147)**			-1.047 (24.859)**
92:Great Britain	0.901 (17.312)**			0.660 (14.269)**	-0.051 (1.155)			-0.097 (2.171)*
87:Western Germany	1.061 (21.324)**			0.628 (13.781)**	-0.323 (7.644)**			-0.403 (9.181)**
91:Western Germany	1.192 (26.405)**			0.978 (24.365)**	-1.099 (28.645)**			-1.127 (29.089)**
92:Western Germany	0.999 (22.786)**			0.719 (18.138)**	-0.598 (16.048)**			-0.623 (16.275)**
96:Western Germany	1.154 (21.664)**			0.936 (19.790)**	-0.820 (18.110)**			-0.844 (18.489)**
91:Eastern Germany	2.138 (40.588)**			2.019 (43.510)**	-0.865 (19.322)**			-0.843 (18.829)**
92:Eastern Germany	1.981 (38.214)**			1.377 (29.090)**	-0.384 (8.712)**			-0.385 (8.418)**
96:Eastern Germany	1.941 (37.705)**			1.707 (37.386)**	-1.014 (23.169)**			-1.017 (23.083)**
87:Austria	1.233 (22.302)**			0.794 (15.811)**	0.022 (0.462)			-0.011 (0.230)
92:Austria	0.997 (18.671)**			0.630 (13.166)**	0.029 (0.634)			0.011 (0.235)
87:The Netherlands	0.924 (19.367)**			0.793 (18.474)**	-0.470 (11.585)**			-0.414 (9.989)**
91:The Netherlands	0.735 (16.359)**			0.642 (15.974)**	-0.814 (21.305)**			-0.817 (21.066)**
96:The Netherlands	0.539 (9.490)**			0.610 (12.259)**	-2.092 (43.379)**			-2.069 (43.087)**
92:Italy	1.681 (32.474)**			1.394 (29.587)**	-0.193 (4.395)**			-0.209 (4.593)**
92:Norway	1.310 (27.382)**			1.322 (30.595)**	-0.333 (8.183)**			-0.297 (7.111)**
<i>Structural Variables</i>								
Sex (1=women)		0.108 (6.731)**	0.132 (8.390)**	0.150 (10.235)**		0.028 (1.807)	0.023 (1.491)	0.005 (0.365)
Age (in years)		-0.002 (3.353)**	0.000 (0.106)	-0.002 (3.215)**		0.006 (11.539)**	0.006 (10.746)**	0.006 (11.879)**
Rel. Income		-0.081 (7.384)**	-0.193 (17.237)**	-0.175 (16.381)**		-0.061 (5.824)**	-0.038 (3.458)**	-0.043 (4.179)**
No Income		0.063 (2.474)*	0.001 (0.038)	-0.042 (1.765)		-0.110 (4.517)**	-0.097 (3.985)**	0.001 (0.045)
Education (Casmin 2)		-0.238 (11.996)**	-0.199 (10.271)**	-0.231 (12.316)**		-0.079 (4.148)**	-0.087 (4.566)**	-0.044 (2.411)*
Education (Casmin 3)		-0.376 (18.227)**	-0.347 (17.193)**	-0.355 (17.853)**		-0.081 (4.096)**	-0.087 (4.405)**	-0.071 (3.697)**
Self-Employed		-0.287 (9.879)**	-0.280 (9.864)**	-0.261 (9.837)**		0.159 (5.714)**	0.157 (5.666)**	0.081 (3.162)**
Unemployed		0.369 (9.759)**	0.294 (7.963)**	0.147 (4.251)**		-0.078 (2.168)*	-0.063 (1.741)	-0.050 (1.507)
Not in Labor Force		0.067 (3.510)**	0.014 (0.764)	0.016 (0.916)		-0.028 (1.523)	-0.017 (0.925)	-0.024 (1.439)
Own Social Standing		-0.084 (17.082)**	-0.073 (15.313)**	-0.051 (10.839)**		0.007 (1.457)	0.005 (1.002)	0.017 (3.766)**
Political Left		0.264 (28.042)**	0.243 (26.369)**	0.223 (25.588)**		-0.062 (6.884)**	-0.058 (6.392)**	-0.055 (6.483)**
No pol. View		0.186 (8.313)**	0.140 (6.429)**	0.052 (2.369)*		0.210 (9.847)**	0.220 (10.276)**	-0.024 (1.107)
Income Inequality		0.441 (52.381)**	0.427 (51.983)**	0.424 (53.496)**		0.048 (5.913)**	0.050 (6.253)**	0.037 (4.831)**
Gini			-3.696 (33.756)**				0.762 (7.113)**	
Constant	-1.008 (29.921)**	-1.965 (31.900)**	-0.820 (11.882)**	-2.756 (43.043)**	0.547 (19.112)**	-0.308 (5.222)**	-0.544 (8.048)**	0.264 (4.270)**
Observations	23030	23030	23030	23030	23030	23030	23030	23030
R-squared	0.183	0.242	0.278	0.376	0.168	0.022	0.025	0.181

Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses,

\* significant at 5% level; \*\* significant at 1% level

**Table 11: Multiple Regression Analysis of the Absolute Amount of Injustice (Interaction Effects) ISSP**

Amount of Injustice (ISSP)	model 5		Country	Sex (1=women)	Age (in years)	Rel. Income	Casmin 2	Casmin 3	Self- Employed	Un- employed	Own Social Standing	Political Left
Sex (1=women)	-0.066 (1.744)	91:United States										
Age (in years)	0.000 (0.320)	92:United States	-0.212 (1.085)	0.076 (1.373)	0.000 (0.027)	0.030 (0.911)	0.007 (0.094)	-0.150 (1.626)	-0.030 (0.333)	-0.384 (2.248)*	0.032 (2.014)*	0.100 (2.625)**
Rel. Income	-0.031 (1.319)	87:Great Britain	-0.238 (1.212)	0.034 (0.604)	-0.002 (0.880)	0.023 (0.511)	-0.062 (0.818)	-0.179 (2.197)*	0.061 (0.643)	-0.573 (3.787)**	0.008 (0.469)	0.090 (2.681)**
No Income	-0.029 (1.317)	91:Great Britain										
Education (Casmin-level 2)	0.025 (0.489)	92:Great Britain	0.132 (0.652)	0.072 (1.224)	-0.003 (1.575)	0.077 (1.780)	-0.057 (0.694)	-0.218 (2.633)**	0.278 (2.818)**	-0.665 (4.210)**	-0.016 (0.875)	0.074 (2.140)*
Education (Casmin-level 3)	0.200 (3.238)**	87:Western Germany	-0.336 (1.815)	0.033 (0.614)	0.001 (0.733)	0.027 (1.067)	0.073 (1.054)	-0.006 (0.070)	-0.091 (0.921)	-0.518 (2.977)**	-0.004 (0.223)	0.055 (1.663)
Self-Employed	-0.064 (0.992)	91:Western Germany										
Unemployed	0.621 (4.928)**	92:Western Germany	-0.333 (1.976)*	0.081 (1.671)	0.001 (0.611)	0.070 (1.704)	-0.001 (0.009)	-0.051 (0.672)	0.061 (0.623)	-0.604 (3.875)**	0.003 (0.172)	0.042 (1.435)
Not in Labor Force	-0.044 (3.049)**	96:Western Germany										
Own Social Standing	-0.024 (2.145)*	91:Eastern Germany										
Political Left	0.013 (0.568)	92:Eastern Germany	-0.056 (0.277)	0.023 (0.397)	0.001 (0.704)	0.000 (0.006)	-0.081 (1.099)	-0.260 (2.774)**	-0.140 (1.141)	-0.712 (5.041)**	-0.011 (0.591)	0.007 (0.207)
Income Inequality	0.137 (20.357)**	96:Eastern Germany										
		87:Austria	-0.148 (0.706)	0.006 (0.103)	0.002 (1.184)	-0.023 (0.406)	-0.098 (1.241)	-0.159 (1.706)	0.113 (1.155)	-0.351 (1.742)	-0.029 (1.510)	0.065 (1.629)
		87:The Netherlands	-0.595 (3.288)**	0.064 (1.212)	-0.001 (0.582)	-0.025 (0.512)	-0.013 (0.182)	-0.085 (1.076)	0.148 (1.542)	-0.719 (4.440)**	0.003 (0.190)	0.098 (2.999)**
		91:The Netherlands										
		96:The Netherlands										
		92:Italy	-0.249 (1.266)	-0.029 (0.509)	0.000 (0.208)	-0.006 (0.118)	-0.060 (0.726)	-0.167 (1.930)	0.100 (1.133)	-0.628 (3.711)**	-0.015 (0.854)	-0.003 (0.105)
		92:Norway	-0.450 (2.161)*	0.101 (1.909)	0.002 (0.833)	0.013 (0.323)	-0.056 (0.603)	-0.165 (1.790)	0.135 (1.493)	-0.598 (3.898)**	0.010 (0.580)	0.019 (0.559)
Observations	12224	Constant	0.376 (2.802)**									
R-squared	0.129											

Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses

\* significant at 5% level; \*\* significant at 1% level

**Table 12: Multiple Regression Analysis of the Absolute Amount of Injustice (Interaction Effects) ISJP**

Amount of Injustice (ISJP)	model 5		Country	Sex (1=women)	Age (in years)	Rel. Income	Casmin 2	Casmin 3	Self- Employed	Un- employed	Own Social Standing	Political Left
Sex (1=women)	-0.011 (0.261)	91:United States	Ref.									
Age (in years)	0.002 (1.144)	92:United States										
Rel. Income	-0.050 (1.617)	87:Great Britain										
No Income	0.094 (3.408)**	91:Great Britain	-0.070 (0.316)	0.001 (0.016)	-0.003 (1.275)	-0.019 (0.397)	0.150 (1.539)	0.081 (0.832)	-0.110 (1.006)	-0.223 (1.390)	-0.024 (1.169)	0.094 (2.569)*
Education (Casmin-level 2)	-0.183 (2.438)*	92:Great Britain										
Education (Casmin-level 3)	-0.185 (2.560)*	87:Western Germany										
Self-Employed	0.028 (0.402)	91:Western Germany	0.274 (1.284)	-0.093 (1.565)	-0.002 (1.199)	0.117 (2.231)*	0.138 (1.539)	0.084 (0.937)	-0.178 (1.597)	0.167 (0.878)	-0.044 (2.161)*	0.086 (2.533)*
Unemployed	0.195 (1.676)	92:Western Germany										
Not in Labor Force	0.040 (1.836)	96:Western Germany	0.916 (3.511)**	-0.143 (1.950)	-0.003 (1.238)	0.089 (1.236)	-0.173 (1.668)	0.043 (0.391)	-0.022 (0.162)	-0.042 (0.233)	-0.078 (3.090)**	-0.014 (0.342)
Own Social Standing	0.002 (0.174)	91:Eastern Germany	0.364 (1.485)	0.004 (0.049)	0.001 (0.368)	0.037 (0.485)	0.162 (1.578)	0.137 (1.181)	-0.205 (1.441)	0.083 (0.543)	-0.047 (1.972)*	-0.039 (0.952)
Political Left	0.023 (0.979)	92:Eastern Germany										
Income Inequality	0.179 (18.863)**	96:Eastern Germany	0.419 (1.609)	-0.104 (1.450)	-0.002 (0.722)	0.108 (1.261)	0.171 (1.566)	0.297 (2.573)*	-0.126 (0.992)	-0.004 (0.027)	-0.037 (1.497)	-0.037 (0.852)
		87:Austria										
		87:The Netherlands										
		91:The Netherlands	-0.253 (1.221)	-0.036 (0.622)	0.000 (0.226)	-0.007 (0.132)	0.168 (1.800)	0.187 (2.203)*	-0.026 (0.284)	-0.202 (1.304)	-0.027 (1.349)	0.058 (1.794)
		96:The Netherlands	-0.417 (1.646)	0.041 (0.540)	-0.002 (0.929)	0.077 (1.112)	0.161 (1.409)	0.324 (2.814)**	-0.034 (0.241)	-0.103 (0.507)	-0.014 (0.541)	0.083 (1.971)*
		92:Italy										
		92:Norway										
Observations	8020	Constant	-0.016 (0.104)									
R-squared	0.121											

Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses

\* significant at 5% level; \*\* significant at 1% level

**Table 13: Multiple Regression Analysis of Etatism (Interaction Effects)**

Etatism	model 5		Country	Sex (1=women)	Age (in years)	Rel. Income	Casmin 2	Casmin 3	Self- Employed	Un- employed	Own Social Standing	Political Left
Sex (1=women)	0.038 (0.627)	91:United States	0.767 (2.614)**	0.294 (3.467)**	-0.007 (2.758)**	-0.034 (0.613)	-0.178 (1.398)	-0.344 (2.512)*	-0.043 (0.314)	0.499 (1.939)	0.035 (1.364)	-0.201 (4.133)**
Age (in years)	-0.006 (3.016)**	92:United States	-0.279 (0.886)	0.193 (2.159)*	0.000 (0.080)	0.055 (1.045)	-0.101 (0.810)	-0.223 (1.493)	0.064 (0.443)	0.298 (1.087)	-0.034 (1.356)	0.178 (2.886)**
Rel. Income	-0.281 (7.716)**	87:Great Britain	0.347 (1.121)	-0.015 (0.167)	0.005 (1.686)	0.032 (0.448)	0.204 (1.698)	0.184 (1.416)	0.096 (0.641)	0.160 (0.665)	-0.034 (1.297)	0.077 (1.447)
No Income	-0.040 (1.666)	91:Great Britain	1.103 (3.742)**	0.227 (2.565)*	-0.001 (0.503)	0.061 (1.026)	0.133 (1.166)	-0.068 (0.527)	0.025 (0.163)	0.390 (1.571)	-0.022 (0.851)	-0.087 (1.684)
Education (Casmin-level 2)	-0.421 (5.245)**	92:Great Britain	0.736 (2.312)*	0.159 (1.703)	0.000 (0.122)	0.076 (1.113)	0.073 (0.571)	-0.031 (0.239)	0.016 (0.103)	0.239 (0.952)	-0.050 (1.819)	0.039 (0.706)
Education (Casmin-level 3)	-0.468 (4.768)**	87:Western Germany	1.279 (4.212)**	0.122 (1.385)	0.005 (1.818)	0.243 (6.010)**	0.247 (2.214)*	0.269 (1.944)	0.291 (1.837)	0.454 (1.638)	-0.070 (2.559)*	-0.160 (2.929)**
Self-Employed	-0.327 (3.267)**	91:Western Germany	1.646 (5.788)**	0.165 (2.056)*	0.004 (1.486)	0.109 (1.645)	0.235 (2.282)*	0.272 (2.260)*	0.174 (1.153)	0.429 (1.520)	-0.060 (2.356)*	-0.235 (4.809)**
Unemployed	-0.120 (0.597)	92:Western Germany	1.318 (4.888)**	0.238 (3.044)**	0.002 (0.733)	-0.016 (0.246)	0.234 (2.358)*	0.155 (1.259)	0.185 (1.187)	0.540 (2.152)*	-0.032 (1.308)	-0.241 (5.219)**
Not in Labor Force	-0.002 (0.104)	96:Western Germany	1.071 (3.162)**	-0.045 (0.478)	0.003 (0.956)	0.075 (0.825)	0.083 (0.690)	0.199 (1.378)	-0.087 (0.498)	-0.091 (0.347)	0.014 (0.428)	-0.120 (2.088)*
Own Social Standing	-0.025 (1.441)	91:Eastern Germany	1.737 (5.382)**	0.067 (0.720)	0.020 (6.455)**	0.016 (0.164)	0.286 (2.412)*	0.223 (1.501)	0.024 (0.131)	0.081 (0.341)	0.027 (0.914)	-0.286 (4.983)**
Political Left	0.364 (9.862)**	92:Eastern Germany	1.734 (5.342)**	0.043 (0.472)	0.009 (2.815)**	0.104 (1.074)	0.369 (3.144)**	0.179 (1.188)	0.017 (0.087)	0.124 (0.546)	-0.013 (0.476)	-0.263 (4.621)**
No pol. View	0.029 (1.304)	96:Eastern Germany	2.414 (7.236)**	0.066 (0.724)	0.013 (4.358)**	-0.034 (0.315)	0.437 (3.551)**	0.414 (2.815)**	-0.127 (0.738)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.105 (3.577)**	-0.319 (5.484)**
Income Inequality	0.424 (53.053)**	87:Austria	1.752 (5.116)**	0.008 (0.077)	0.003 (0.977)	0.060 (0.643)	0.205 (1.548)	-0.031 (0.205)	0.206 (1.291)	0.673 (2.002)*	-0.045 (1.445)	-0.302 (4.613)**
		92:Austria	1.225 (3.589)**	0.027 (0.289)	0.005 (1.846)	0.077 (0.964)	0.388 (2.994)**	0.166 (1.212)	0.118 (0.629)	0.351 (1.277)	-0.018 (0.579)	-0.274 (4.382)**
		87:The Netherlands	0.498 (1.742)	-0.029 (0.342)	0.010 (3.691)**	0.173 (2.199)*	0.314 (2.857)**	0.303 (2.399)*	0.166 (1.108)	0.156 (0.589)	-0.037 (1.494)	-0.044 (0.852)
		91:The Netherlands	-0.028 (0.100)	0.085 (1.057)	0.008 (2.741)**	0.185 (2.861)**	0.337 (3.032)**	0.372 (3.222)**	0.113 (0.859)	0.335 (1.359)	0.058 (2.207)*	-0.104 (2.166)*
		96:The Netherlands	0.081 (0.239)	0.004 (0.037)	0.014 (4.092)**	0.148 (1.647)	0.260 (1.924)	0.230 (1.515)	0.064 (0.320)	0.417 (1.389)	0.002 (0.058)	-0.079 (1.352)
		92:Italy	1.652 (5.180)**	0.212 (2.306)*	0.010 (3.106)**	0.064 (0.823)	0.361 (2.716)**	0.267 (1.912)	0.023 (0.166)	0.512 (1.869)	-0.007 (0.239)	-0.324 (6.091)**
		92:Norway	1.655 (5.003)**	0.220 (2.589)**	0.003 (0.950)	0.137 (2.085)*	0.216 (1.508)	0.028 (0.195)	0.199 (1.373)	0.507 (2.074)*	-0.020 (0.719)	-0.162 (2.950)**
Observations	23030	Constant	-3.002 (14.191)**									
R-squared	0.398											

Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses

\* significant at 5% level; \*\* significant at 1% level