

# ISJP

---

International Social Justice Project - Arbeitsgruppe für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland

Justice Ideologies, Perceptions of Reward Justice,  
and Transformation: East and West Germany in  
Comparison\*

Arbeitsbericht Nr. 52

Bernd Wegener

Bodo Lippl

Bernhard Christoph

Institut für Sozialwissenschaften  
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin  
Unter den Linden 6  
10099 Berlin

Mai 2000

\* To be published as chapter 6 of D. S. Mason and J. R. Kluegel (Eds.): *Justice in Transition: Changing Public Opinion about Politics, the Market, and Social Inequality in Central and Eastern Europe* (forthcoming).

**Introduction**

Communism’s peaceful downfall in eastern Germany in 1989 and the country’s subsequent unification left many people’s lives turned upside down – in the East as well as in the West. There was much enthusiasm in the beginning but, as many have observed (Maier 1997), the honeymoon period of the early days has given way to disillusion once it became apparent that Germany’s reunification had produced not only winners but losers as well. As a result we see growing prejudice, intolerance and charges of injustice that citizens of the East and of the West turn against each other. Of these misgivings some even say that they have piled up to form a new “inner” wall (Gensicke 1996; Sa’adah 1998; Brunner and Walz 1998; Wegener and Liebig 1998).

But what has in fact changed since the peaceful revolution and the joyful days of unification? What are the directions Germany’s economic, social, and political development has taken since, and on which issues do East and West Germans actually have different points of view? Where do we observe consensus? These are the questions this chapter will address. We begin by describing Germany’s actual development since unification, relying on official statistics. Then we will look at justice sentiments on both sides of the former border, and how these were affected by unification.

Germany’s unification is a special instance of the ongoing transformation we witness in other states of the former eastern bloc. As a conceptual framework to distinguish the German transformation from others, it will be helpful to link our account to a system of possible domains of transformation processes in general, distinguishing the economic realm from both the social and the political. There is thus a background of objective facts resulting from transformation which can be described (1) by economic indexes and their development over time, (2) by changes in the characteristics of the social structure of society,

and (3) by the transfer of political institutions and the influx of élites.

However, what we are interested in most is how the ongoing changes in these domains are perceived and evaluated by individuals in East and West Germany from a justice point of view.

Domain	Factual	Subjective
Economy	Development of economic indexes	Justice ideologies and reward justice
Social structure	Change in the extent of social inequality	Reward justice of others and social inequality perceptions
Political institutions	Transfer of institutions and élites	Legitimation beliefs and individual satisfaction

Table 1: Factual and Subjective Transformation Domains

So in Table 1 for each *factual* transformation domain there is a *subjective* equivalent in terms of the possible individual justice responses that may arise in these domains. For the justice responses in the economic sphere we take advantage of a distinction that social justice research has brought to light and that has structured the discipline since the early 1980s (Brickman et al. 1981; Wegener 1992b, 1999, 2000). The basic distinction is that there are two different modes of making justice judgments: One expresses *justice ideologies* and the other the perception of *reward justice*. Justice ideologies are matters of principles. By upholding a particular ideology, one prefers certain principles that a distribution regime should fulfill in order to be just. The principle of equal distribution would be one example; others are the achievement principle, seniority, need, or – reminiscent of Rawls (1971) – the principle that redistribution should benefit that group in a society that is worst off. Reward justice, on the other hand, is something analytically apart from any “logic of principles.” Reward justice addresses the goods or the amount of some divisible quantity a rewardee receives (or, for that matter, the weight of the burden he or she has to shoulder) specifying whether the reward (or burden) is either a just reward, an unjust overreward or an unjust underreward. Whatever the case may be, reward justice means that we make rewardee-specific judgements about *what* and *how much* someone should get, and we evaluate ac-

tual shares against what we think a just share should be (Jasso 1989; Jasso and Wegener 1997). In making these judgments we may or may not be guided by a justice ideology – most often we are not, however, simply because the ideologies are too abstract, too difficult to comprehend and, in any event, inapplicable to the case in question.

So looking at the changes in the distribution of *economic well-being* procured by transformation, we apply a twofold empirical scheme (Table 1, first row). We ask first for the justice ideologies the two German populations support and whether there is consensus or not in this respect; and we ask second for the “justness” of the shares of rewards, mostly income, individuals receive, and also what they think they should receive, if just, and why they believe they don’t receive what they should receive.

Reward justice, of course, can also be non-reflexive, meaning that the shares of others, not one’s own, are considered. Non-reflexive reward justice represents the evaluative side of the perception of social inequality in a society. Is the distribution of income, for instance, just and does everyone receive the rewards they justly deserve? Changes in the *social structure* of East and West Germany following the transformation should therefore be contrasted, first, with how inequality is perceived by Germans and, second, whether they think the extent of social inequality results from just rewards or not (Table 1, second row).

Finally, transformation processes affect politics such that new political institutions are introduced and new élites gain access to power positions. In the case of the East German transformation we have witnessed a gigantic transfer in both respects as West German institutions were simply extended into the East along with West German élites who stood ready to fill the key positions of these institutions. It is time then to ask in what way this particular German mode of transformation affects the institutions’ legitimacy in the eyes of the general

public. And on a more personal level: How satisfied with their lives are individuals who are confronted with this “invasion” from the West (of which some speak of as downright “colonization”)? So in row three of Table 1 we ask for the *political legitimization* beliefs that people associate with the transfer process, and we ask how satisfied with their lives they are personally. We do all this comparatively, testing whether there are differences in beliefs between East and West Germans and, of course, whether there has been a change over time in this respect.

### **The German Transformation**

Characterizing the East German transformation we distinguish between two different kinds of transformations in general – one that is *open* with regard to goals and outcomes and one that is *closed*. The latter is characterized by the comprehensive transfer and adoption of western institutions (Reißig 1997a, 1997b), whereas in the former only the framework for subsequent political developments, institution building, and individuals’ actions is given. There are no predefined goals in the “open” case, i. e. outcomes are uncertain. Consequently it is no easy task to evaluate the success of an “open” transformation since the criteria for appraisal will have to emerge as part of the transformation process itself. Evaluation criteria are readily given if transformation is “closed,” however, since western institutions serve as unequivocal models. It is the closed version that applies to the East German case, of course. Transformations’ success in East Germany can be measured by the extent to which the new western-type institutions have been established and work as efficiently as in the West (Zapf and Habich 1996; Lehmbruch 1994), and in this respect the East German transformation can be considered to have been successful. In fact, by adopting the West German “ready-made state” (Rose and Haerpfer 1996; Rose et al. 1993) the risk of failure of transformation was low from the beginning. Also, the institutional transfer as-

sured, among other things, the immediate coverage with social security measures for the entire population (Rose et al. 1993), and it was supported by the transfer of administration personnel with western training and experiences, as well as by enormous financial inputs from the federal government. Consequently the progress in East Germany was much faster than in other former communist countries.

In the other central and eastern European countries the situation was completely different. One of the pressing problems here was that they had to rely only on their own resources without financial or personnel support from the outside. This situation was generally worsened by the “problem of simultaneity” (Offe 1994; Elster et al. 1998): The political élites of these countries had to process three different tasks at the same time: 1. reorganizing of economic institutions, 2. establishing a democratic constitutional government, and 3. consolidating the territorial nation state. These tasks are partly incompatible with each other and it is therefore difficult to accomplish all three together. Due to the special East German situation discussed above this problem was nonexistent in the German case.

#### Are Attitudinal Differences Caused By Socialization or Situational Factors?

We must also look at how the transformation is perceived and evaluated by the affected people. There are two positions on how to interpret different attitudes found in East and West Germany: On the one hand the dissimilarities are explained by the specific historic and cultural developments in both parts of Germany since World War II. One can argue just as well, however, that the differences result from the transformation process following unification itself (Wegener and Liebig 1995a; Pollack 1997; Pollack and Pickel 1998). The first, the “socialization hypotheses,” traces the different attitudes in both parts of the country back to differences in socialization in the two former German states. Socialization means that attitudes are considered

to be stable – almost like personality traits. If there is change it will definitely come slowly and will take years. Thus, socialized attitudes can gain the level of change-resistant “dominant ideologies” (Abercrombie et al. 1990) rooted in a country’s political culture and heritage (Wegener and Liebig 1995a). The second explanation is known as the “situation hypotheses.” Here it is argued that the different attitudes of East and West Germans reflect the differences of their specific (rational) interests under the social conditions encountered in East and West Germany today. This perspective does not necessarily exclude the influence of socialization but this influence is considered to be small compared to the effect of people’s current situation. The situation hypothesis would imply then that as the living conditions in both parts of Germany become more similar so will the attitudes of East and West Germans.

The controversy, however, goes beyond simply explaining why East and West Germans have different attitudes. Both arguments are also important for the West-to-East transfer of *institutions*. As Offe (1994) has pointed out, transferring formal institutional structures is not sufficient at all for guaranteeing the proper functioning of these institutions. Institutions cannot exist without a value foundation. They are based on traditions, inherited routines, normative principles and cultural preferences that are for the most part implicit but nevertheless indispensable (Weber 1972; Lepsius 1995). This is why transferring institutions is successful only if the necessary values and expectations are congruent in the populations of both sides. It is relatively easy to transfer institutions from one country (or part of a country) to another, but the transport of values and traditions is a different matter (Offe 1994; Eisen and Wollmann 1996).

The question then is how flexible the East Germans are in adapting to the values necessary for the foundation of institutions. It is with this background that it is worthwhile studying whether the values held by East Germans were produced through so-

cialization or whether they are short-term reactions to the current conditions originating from the unification process.

### ***Economic, Social, and Political Changes After Unification***

#### **Economic Indexes**

There are noticeable changes in the economic development in Germany in the years after reunification. The most obvious is the continuing equalization of incomes. From 1991 to 1996 the average net income in West Germany increased by roughly 10 percent, whereas the increase in East Germany during the same time interval was about 70 percent (StaBA 1997: 263). Thus, given the much lower income level in East Germany at the time of unification, both parts of the country have moved closer together. Indeed, the equalization of incomes met one of the most central demands the East Germans put forth when the unification process began. Therefore it is frequently looked upon as *the* indicator of the unification policy's success. However, reduced income inequality does not necessarily imply a growing equality of economic power between both parts of the country. There are still huge productivity differences between East and West Germany even though average East German productivity between 1991 and 1996 increased from 31 to almost 60 percent of the West German level (Jahresgutachten 1997). Thus, while East and West have moved closer together in both respects, the adjustment of wages in East Germany has progressed much faster than the development of productivity would have justified. Another aspect of the economic development in unified Germany is the Gross Domestic Product. From 1991 to 1996 East Germany's GDP has grown from 206 Billion German Mark to 397.7 (in current prices); in West Germany the increase was from 2647.6 to 3141 (StaBA 1997: 254). Thus the GDP of East Germany has grown much faster than that of the West, but the gap between the GDPs of both parts of

Germany is still very large. This is particularly evident if one takes the respective population sizes into account, as one must. There are roughly four times more West than East German adults, but in 1991 the GDP ratio West to East was about 13:1 and was still 8:1 in 1996. Moreover, East German firms are still producing primarily for their own regional markets, even though export has increased markedly over the last couple of years (DIW 1998). Thus, even though the problems of the East German economy are not as serious today as they were shortly after the monetary union in 1990, it is still lagging behind its western counterpart.

#### **Aspects of Social Development**

A significant indicator of social well-being of a society is the unemployment rate. From 1991 to 1996 unemployment steadily increased in both parts of Germany – from 10.3 to 16.7 percent in East Germany and from 6.3 to 10.1 percent in West Germany (StaBA 1997: 91). As these numbers show, the positive development of other economic indicators (productivity, GDP) has obviously not contributed to reducing the unemployment rate. On the contrary, it must be assumed that the positive economic development was only possible through accepting rising unemployment. Productivity gains in East Germany in particular are the dramatic results of rationalization, downsizing and layoffs.

What is particularly striking is the unexpectedly high unemployment rate of East German women in comparison to men – rising to 19.9 percent in the East in 1996 compared to 9.9 percent in the West (StaBA 1997: 91). This stands in sharp contrast to the high labor force participation of women in the former German Democratic Republic (Kohli 1994; Geißler 1996). As some scholars argue (Heering and Schroeter 1995; Nickel 1995, 1997) East German female unemployment is rooted in the labor market policies of the GDR. According to these authors the GDR labor market was segregated horizontally as well as vertically. This meant on the one

hand that women were concentrated in a few, low-rated occupations (horizontal segregation). On the other hand, even in the occupations dominated by women, men usually held the higher positions (vertical segregation). Men also had better access to job training and advancement programs that were a major source of career mobility in East Germany (Diewald and Mayer 1996). After unification, within the new market economy, these preconditions led to the disadvantaged positions of women we can find today.

Next to the unemployment rate it is social inequality that matters most in describing a society. Calculating the Gini coefficient for income (Sen 1997) over the 1991-1996 interval (StaBA 1997) two pieces of information stand out: First, income inequality is lower in East than in West Germany; and second, the inequality of income increased in both parts of the country – in the East more than in the West. The Gini climbed from .192 in East Germany in 1991 to .208 in 1995, but only from .259 to .276 in West Germany (Krause 1995). One likely explanation for the still existent East-West difference is the dramatic wage increase in East Germany that served the well-off to a greater extent than the average income earner.

Part of Country	Poverty Line	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	Change 91-95
West Germany	40%	4.2	4.4	4.1	5.2	4.8	5.7	1.5
	50%	10.6	10.1	9.8	11.2	11.4	11.9	1.3
	60%	18.9	19.4	20.2	20.9	21.7	21.6	2.7
East Germany	40%	0.9	2.3	2.3	2.8	3.6	2.6	1.7
	50%	3.7	4.2	6.3	6.2	8.3	8.0	4.3
	60%	10.7	10.0	10.4	13.1	13.6	13.6	2.9

Table 2: Percent of People in Poverty Using Different Relative Measures ('90-'95)

A related indicator of the social situation in a country is the extent of poverty. Poverty research distinguishes between absolute and relative poverty, absolute poverty meaning that a person's income is below subsistence level, whereas relative poverty is determined as a certain percentage income level below the average. For the present purpose we use relative poverty measures based on percentages of the average household income in Germany. Table 2 shows the percentages of households that

do not have available at least 40, 50 or 60 percent of the average net household income of East and West Germany, respectively.

As we see, poverty has steadily increased in both parts of Germany throughout the 90s – this is so regardless of the percentage criterion used. But the proportions of the poor are increasing in particular if expressed by the 60 percent measure. This could well indicate that poverty today in Germany is gradually affecting also the lower middle class (Leibfried and Leisering 1995). Besides that we see that poverty in East Germany has increased more sharply than in West Germany but that the level of poverty is higher in the West than in the East (Hauser 1995; Hauser and Wagner 1997).

### Germany's Modest Swing to the Left

It is no easy task to describe the political situation and development after German unification. One crude indicator would be to look at the party vote in the federal elections since 1990. In Table 3 the vote percentages for the major political parties between 1990 (the first election after unification) and 1998 (the most recent election) are given.

	SPD			CDU/CSU			Bündnis 90/ Die Grünen		
	EG	WG	Total	EG	WG	Total	EG	WG	Total
1990	24.3	35.7	33.5	41.8	44.3	43.8	6.1	4.8	--*
1994	31.5	37.5	36.4	38.5	42.1	41.4	4.3	7.9	7.3
1998	35.1	42.3	40.9	27.3	37.1	35.1	4.1	7.3	6.7
	FDP			PDS			Other Parties		
	EG	WG	Total	EG	WG	Total	EG	WG	Total
1990	12.9	10.6	11.0	11.1	0.3	2.4	3.7	4.3	4.2
1994	3.5	7.7	6.9	19.8	1.0	4.4	2.4	3.9	3.6
1998	3.3	7.0	6.2	21.6	1.2	5.1	8.6	5.1	6.0

Sources: For 1990 and 1994: StaBA (1998): own calculations; for 1998: Wiesendahl (1998: 754).

\* There were two Green parties in 1990, one in East Germany (*Bündnis 90*) and one in West Germany (*Die Grünen*) precluding the calculation of a total score.

Table 3: Vote Percentages By Party, Federal Elections

Since unification there is a gradual shift from a conservative to a social democratic majority that is evident if we look at the votes for the two major parties, the CDU (Christian Democrats) and the SPD (Social Democrats). The SPD steadily increased its share of the votes in both parts of the country since 1990. In contrast, the CDU lost a substantial part of its vote, especially

in East Germany. Therefore the liberal-conservative coalition of the CDU and the liberal FDP (led by Helmut Kohl) that governed the country in 1990 and in 1994 was replaced by a coalition of Social Democrats and Greens (Bündnis90/the Greens) in 1998 (with Gerhard Schröder as chancellor).

The substantial loss of votes experienced by the conservatives in East Germany is an indication for the growing discontent of the East Germans with the politics of the conservative-liberal government that had supplemented the unification process so heavily. There has also been an increase in votes for the PDS (the former communist party) in East Germany that points into the same direction. What we witness here is a growing disapproval, if not protest against the subordination to western style parties and institutions (Wiesendahl 1998).

In sum, one can say that since reunification both parts of Germany have moved closer together in many respects. The eastern economy made ground in comparison to West Germany, though the speed of adjustment has slowed down in the last couple of years. To describe Germany's social situation is more difficult. Growing inequality is definitely one important aspect, but at least as significant is the continuously high unemployment rate particularly in the East. This is also reflected in the swing towards the left in the federal elections and the disproportional high voter turnout in favor of the PDS, East Germany's former communist party. While by and large the East German transformation must be considered a success, in particular in view of other eastern European transformation societies, the result should be characterized as an "external unity" – an unity of institutions only. Whether the "internal unity" is something still to be achieved, as some argue (Kaase 1993; Veen 1997), will be discussed in the rest of this paper when we deal with the subjective dimension of transformation, i. e. with differences and commonalities of justice beliefs held by individuals in East and West Germany.

## ***Justice Ideologies***

### **Individualism**

First we take a look at beliefs and preferences of East and West Germans regarding the functions of the market and the state. Inasmuch as income differences that exist in a society are created by market processes they are in need of justification. How much differences in income do people tolerate and why? Attitudes about the "justice" of such inequalities express justice ideologies because they involve basic visions and principles about how and to what extent social goods should be distributed. The two most relevant justice ideologies in the present context are *individualism* and *egalitarianism* (Douglas 1982; Wegener and Liebig 1995b). In the case of individualism social inequality is considered to be legitimate if the high monetary rewards connected to it are earned by achievement, effort, endurance or by bearing special responsibility. Egalitarianism, in contrast, demands that all have the same shares, or, at least, equal opportunities for making economical progress. Since these conditions usually need to be based on redistribution policies, the state is called upon to take equalizing measures, e. g. guarantee that the needy have a minimal standard of living or impose an upper limit to incomes. According to these general characteristics, the extent to which individualistic attitudes are accepted in Germany is shown in Figure 1. In the ISJP respondents were asked the if they agreed with the following statements: (1) "People who work hard deserve to earn more than those who do not," (2) "People would not want to take extra responsibility at work unless they are paid extra for it," (3) "There is an incentive for individual effort only if differences in income are large enough" and (4) "It is all right if businessmen make good profits because everyone benefits in the end." Answers to these questions were given on five-point rating scales indicating approval or disagreement. The values on which Figure 1 is based are mean values from the

response categories 1 = “strongly disagree” to 5 = “strongly agree.”




Figure 1: Individualism

It is striking to note first that the means for the statements form a rank order that is identical in East and in West Germany, even if both time points are considered, but that variation is greater in the East. The highest approval is voiced vis-à-vis the statement that hard work should be rewarded. The feeling that extra responsibility should justify higher rewards comes second; third that income differences motivate people for investing effort; and fourth that in a market society large profits are eventually beneficial to all. Noteworthy also is that the preferences for all four individualistic items have declined in East Germany from 1991 to 1996 whereas there is almost no change in the West (with the exception of the decreasing belief that income inequalities benefit everyone). This result is surprising, contradicting the popular belief that the premium on achievement within a globalizing economy yields ever more individualism. Especially the low – and in fact decreasing – approval of high profit margins for businesses seems to indicate that the trust in the industry’s commitment to the “common good” is decreasing. We see this particularly in West Germany.

Nevertheless, except for the position that income inequalities benefit everyone, there is overall agreement with individualistic points of views in both parts of the country

(considering the fact that the mean values are on the approval side, i. e. have values above 3.0). Why is this true in particular in East Germany that until recently stood under socialist rule? There are two possible explanations: On the one hand former East Germany, as is true of former West Germany as well, was a society characterized by work, a society, that is, in which the occupational realm had indisputable dominance (Kohli 1994). This can be seen from the almost total labor participation, virtually nonexistent unemployment and the social stigmatization of persons who were out of work. An alternative explanation for the high level of individualism in today’s eastern part of Germany touches upon the fact that individual achievement was not honored properly under socialism and did not receive satisfying monetary rewards. This may have led to an overcompensation directly after unification. East Germans were excited to favor achievement and individual efforts precisely because of the neglect of these virtues under the old rule. Five years later, in 1996, attitudes of individualism are favored less emphatically, bringing the level of individualism in fact to that of West Germany. The stronger emphasis on individualistic values in the East has disappeared.

We do find a difference, however, between the two parts of Germany with regard to the opinion that the profits of enterprises will eventually be beneficial to all. East Germans at both time points show less approval of this assertion than West Germans. A possible interpretation could be that the socialist ideology still persists in the heads of people making them suspicious of entrepreneurial profits. But what is noteworthy is that this item is favored less in 1996 than in 1991 in both parts of the country. While this could be a reflection of the growing income inequality in Germany in general, it could also be explained by the impression people have today that growing profits of firms and corporations have only little effects on wages and the creation of jobs. If “businessmen make good profits” it is because of downsizing and merciless

competition that keeps wages low. In East and West Germany there seems to emerge consensus that this mode of distribution is by no means just.

	"Individual differences are incentives for individ. effort"*				"People take responsibility only for extra pay"*			
	East 1991	East 1996	West 1991	West 1996	East 1991	East 1996	West 1991	West 1996
Part of the country	65.1	60.0	69.3	66.7	87.0	83.8	82.0	82.1
Female	64.9	59.8	66.3	66.3	84.1	84.0	81.3	82.0
Male	65.4	60.1	72.3	67.1	90.3	83.5	82.6	82.1
<i>Age groups in 1989</i>								
16 – 24	55.6	62.9	62.8	70.0	86.1	86.1	80.9	78.4
25 – 42	59.9	59.7	66.8	69.4	86.2	83.2	81.7	83.0
43 – 63	69.1	60.9	74.9	64.3	87.7	84.1	84.9	87.1
64 – 89	80.7	55.6	71.4	61.1	88.2	85.4	79.0	72.5
<i>Education (Casmin)</i>								
Lower level	72.7	59.3	71.3	63.1	88.4	82.4	83.5	80.7
Intermediate level	61.6	58.3	71.3	70.4	86.5	85.0	82.2	85.7
Upper level	62.1	64.6	66.2	68.2	85.7	82.5	80.4	81.0
<i>Subjective class</i>								
Upper	61.5	65.4	69.9	71.7	83.2	82.2	81.5	85.2
Middle	68.9	61.6	70.7	67.8	86.9	85.3	83.6	83.9
Lower	61.8	53.9	66.6	52.1	88.5	82.5	80.3	72.5
<i>Employment status</i>								
Self-employed	67.9	77.1	76.0	71.0	87.0	85.7	83.5	79.0
Retired	76.1	62.3	73.8	63.5	90.4	85.3	83.6	81.0
Unemployed	69.3	51.7	59.4	62.5	85.6	77.0	85.7	77.1

\*Percentages of those agreeing strongly and somewhat.

Table 4: Individualism By Selected Groups

Table 4 looks at attitudinal differences by particular groups and characteristics, looking first at the belief that high income differences motivate effort and secondly at the proposition that people would take on extra responsibility only for extra pay. With regard to these two issues women, for instance, are less individualistic than men, a finding reported often in other studies as well (Wegener and Liebig 1995a). It is usually attributed to gender-specific socialization. Also age makes people favor individualism more. However very old respondents tend to be less individualistic. It seems that being fully integrated into working life makes people hold individualistic attitudes whereas retirement, or the prospect of ending ones career, weakens the individualistic conviction. There is a strong effect of education (measured here according to the CASMIN classification [König et al. 1988]) in East Germany where higher educated people approve more strongly of individualism in contrast to West Germany that has people with a medium level of education prefer individualism. Finally, self-employed and the retired prefer individualism more than the unemployed. Note that there is a sharp

decline in individualistic beliefs from 1991 to 1996 of respondents who see themselves as in the lower social class. This applies to East as well as to West Germany.

### Egalitarianism

In broad terms, the ideology challenging individualism is egalitarianism (Roller 1997). In the ISJP the following items were used to test egalitarian sentiments: (1) "The fairest way of distributing wealth and income would be to give everyone equal shares," (2) "It is fair if people have more money or wealth, but only if there are equal opportunities," and (3) "The most important thing is that people get what they need, even if this means allocating money from those who have earned more than they need." These statements express three different "versions" of egalitarianism: The first, captured by the first item, could be identified as "strict egalitarianism" because the goal is here to distribute equal shares to everyone. The second item alludes to equality of opportunities and the sameness of starting conditions. In its third form egalitarianism means redistribution according to need. All three egalitarian perspectives are considered here to express a preference for redistribution towards more equality – not withstanding the fact that analytically we can distinguish between the three.




Figure 2: Egalitarianism

The results in Figure 2 show that the main difference between East and West Germany in egalitarian beliefs is the stronger preference for the need principle in East Germany both in 1991 and in 1996.

In fact, this difference is so large that it results in a different rank order of preferences in the East compared to West Germany: East Germans prefer the need principle over equal opportunities whereas it is the other way round in the West. Strict egalitarianism plays only a minor role (with all means below 3.0), but its acceptance increased from 1991 to 1996 which may be indicative of a growing sensitivity to social inequality and an unjust distribution of wealth. Particularly in the East strict egalitarianism is gaining ground in 1996. This may well be a reflection of the wage difference between the East and the West. Possibly also the higher unemployment in the East and a general disillusion with the new system contribute to reviving the central socialist ideal of perfect equality. On the same line is also that preference for distribution by need is higher in East than in West Germany at both points in time. It seems that the distribution policies of former socialist Germany oriented towards need have effects that are still visible today.

	"It is fair to give everyone equal shares"*				"The most important thing is that people get what they need"*			
	East 1991	East 1996	West 1991	West 1996	East 1991	East 1996	West 1991	West 1996
Part of the country	23.9	25.8	21.6	24.0	85.3	75.6	76.6	63.1
Female	27.4	26.6	23.3	24.5	84.4	77.8	77.4	65.1
Male	20.0	24.8	19.9	23.5	86.4	73.2	75.9	60.8
<i>Age groups in 1989</i>								
16 – 24	32.6	18.2	28.5	24.3	85.9	67.7	76.9	65.8
25 – 42	23.1	26.9	21.9	22.4	83.5	74.4	74.5	57.0
43 – 63	22.3	26.2	18.4	23.5	85.8	77.0	79.8	65.2
64 – 89	22.5	28.4	20.7	30.6	89.1	90.0	75.8	67.9
<i>Education (Casmin)</i>								
Lower level	30.4	32.2	26.8	31.1	86.0	80.5	75.1	68.3
Intermediate level	24.1	25.7	16.2	17.2	82.5	75.7	77.8	60.3
Upper level	11.6	18.9	18.5	20.7	91.7	70.1	79.9	56.0
<i>Subjective class</i>								
Upper	25.5	17.2	16.8	18.8	87.7	62.0	73.9	59.3
Middle	23.7	27.4	20.2	21.5	85.5	77.5	75.4	64.4
Lower	24.3	29.3	33.1	42.0	84.3	82.9	84.3	67.6
<i>Employment status</i>								
Self-employed	34.0	8.6	18.3	19.3	84.9	41.4	78.6	52.5
Retired	22.1	26.6	20.8	24.8	87.9	81.9	77.0	65.9
Unemployed	31.8	35.9	41.2	30.6	80.9	86.3	82.9	65.3

\*Percentages of those agreeing strongly and somewhat.

Table 5: Egalitarianism By Selected Groups

From Table 5 we see that women in both parts of the country have stronger egalitarian orientations than men, corresponding to the stronger individualism of men. With respect to strict egalitarianism there is an interesting trend of those respondents who were 16-24 years old in 1989 (the year in which communism in East Germany fell). Whereas in 1991 this age group favored strict egalitarianism most strongly in both parts of Germany, this is reversed in 1996, in East Germany more markedly than in the West. In all other cohorts – in the East as well as in the West – egalitarianism is favored more in 1996. So, in East Germany, it is the cohort that is entering work life now that is overcoming socialist sentiments most effectively – looking very much like respondents of that age in the West.

Turning to distribution according to need now (Table 5, right panel) we find that the oldest East Germans support this principle most. This is so at both points in time. An obvious explanation is that, immediately after unification, pensions in East Germany were raised to western standards – a straightforward application of the need principle. The retired in East Germany are therefore a highly privileged group and undoubtedly among the winners of German unification. Looking at education it is obvious that the highest increase in approval for strict egalitarianism can be found in the group of the highly educated East Germans. This presumably is an expression of the increasing dissatisfaction of the former German Democratic Republic's elite with the new system. Nevertheless, we still find that the highly educated reject the need principle most strongly, in East (as well as in West) Germany, in 1991 as well as in 1996. This does come as a surprise since distribution according to need was one of the ideological fix-points of socialism, but it does show that the better educated have harmonized with market values quickly. Agreement with the strict egalitarian item as well as with the need principle is dependent on where on the social ladder respondents place themselves. Usually lower

standing persons prefer egalitarian measures more because they stand to gain from equalizing distributions. This is indeed the pattern we find in the West, both in 1991 and in 1996. But in East Germany in 1991 those who perceive themselves in the upper classes were in fact more egalitarian, in particular more need oriented, than those in the lower classes. This may have been so because, in the former German Democratic Republic, higher standing persons were more closely linked to the ideology of the system having internalized the equalizing socialist convictions more effectively. It took only five years, however, for this group to adapt to the western style; in 1996 we find also in East Germany that only lower-standing persons are egalitarians. This is also true for the unemployed, whereas self-employed tend to be anti-egalitarian.




Figure 3: Etatism

A special mode of egalitarianism involves the role of the state in creating an egalitarian society. This is why in the ISJP respondents were asked to consider the following statements: (1) “The government should guarantee everyone a minimum standard of living,” (2) “The government should place an upper limit on the amount of money one person can make,” and (3) “The government should provide a job for everyone who wants one.” For sake of a label we call the notion behind these items “etatism” (referred to in other chapters in this book also as “statism”).

Based on Figure 3 we conclude that approval for etatism, for all three governmental duties, is higher in East than in West Germany, providing jobs for all receiving the highest marks. In both parts of Germany putting an upper limit on earnings is lowest; particularly in the West the idea of limiting earnings is very unpopular. From a time perspective it is most striking that the demand for the government to provide jobs has gained salience in West Germany from 1991 to 1996, superseding the guarantee of a decent standard of living, but that in East Germany we find a modest decline in the call for job guarantees. This should be seen against the background of rising unemployment rates experienced also in West Germany. With the exception of the demand for a guaranteed standard of living, a call that was dominant in both parts of Germany directly after unification, the ideals of an egalitarian government have moved closer together in East and West even though, also in 1996, East Germans are still more etatistic than West Germans. While this is most certainly the legacy of 40 years of socialist indoctrination of the East German population that has experienced from early on that the state supports and controls the individual (Veen 1997; Meulemann 1996), it must also be seen as a possible consequence of unification.

	“The government should guarantee a min. std. of living”*				“The government should place an upper limit on incomes”*			
	East 1991	East 1996	West 1991	West 1996	East 1991	East 1996	West 1991	West 1996
Part of the country	93.5	88.9	84.9	72.2	60.0	55.2	32.3	39.4
Female	94.2	92.0	85.9	73.3	64.8	56.5	34.0	39.7
Male	92.7	85.6	83.9	71.0	54.5	53.7	30.5	39.1
<i>Age groups in 1989</i>								
16 - 24	90.8	87.6	89.8	73.2	46.8	42.6	36.8	37.5
25 - 42	92.7	86.7	87.6	72.1	51.8	50.3	31.5	37.8
43 - 63	95.4	89.7	82.8	73.7	68.5	63.7	29.4	43.3
64 - 89	93.2	93.3	77.8	63.9	76.2	57.8	35.7	39.4
<i>Education (Casmin)</i>								
Lower level	93.8	91.5	81.7	76.5	76.3	63.9	39.3	46.4
Intermediate level	91.7	88.6	85.7	67.3	56.5	55.4	27.8	33.9
Upper level	97.2	86.3	89.1	70.7	42.0	44.3	25.8	34.9
<i>Subjective class</i>								
Upper	87.0	79.3	84.2	72.4	57.9	36.9	24.1	35.6
Middle	94.0	89.7	74.1	69.5	59.3	55.5	31.3	35.1
Lower	94.4	95.0	88.8	77.6	61.5	68.3	47.6	57.0
<i>Employment status</i>								
Self-employed	85.2	72.9	72.8	64.5	42.6	30.0	27.2	21.0
Retired	95.3	91.7	78.6	72.6	79.3	63.1	36.2	45.9
Unemployed	96.7	94.1	100.0	74.5	56.7	63.0	42.9	55.1

\*Percentages of those agreeing strongly and somewhat.

Table 6: Etatism By Selected Groups

In the newly united country East Germans expect higher state support for themselves since they were “beginners in capitalism” and needed assistance in learning to cope with the social and economic system of the West (Pollack 1997). This mode of interpretation seems to have some merit in view of the fact that etatistic preferences have decreased in East Germany since 1991.

Table 6 shows that women in both parts of Germany prefer a strong role of the state for securing a minimum standard of living and as an agent of redistribution. In the East especially the older age cohorts – the retired – call upon the state, though overall preferences for state intervention have gone down by 1996. With respect to a minimum standard of living, in 1991 it is preferred most strongly by those with the highest education. This is true for West as well as for East Germany. In 1996 this situation has changed: Preferences for a guaranteed minimum living standard are now stronger in the lowest educational group. It seems that in 1991 the old educational élite still manages to uphold the idea of a strong state whereas in 1996 it has arranged itself with the new system to a certain extent.

Comparing the unemployed to the retired with respect to both measures the unemployed have a higher preference for a strong state. They favor redistribution and social security more often. In contrast to that the self-employed have rather low preferences for these issues. With respect to an upper income limit the position of the retired is somewhat diffuse. In the West their preference for the interventionist state increases from 1991 to 1996, it decreases in the East during the same time. This is probably a result of the exceptionally good situation of the East German who retired after unification. Some receive considerable pensions without ever having made contributions to the pension funds during their working life, whereas West German pensioners had to endure cuts in payments repeatedly in the recent past.

### Fatalism

The transformation process constitutes an enormous challenge to the individuals, in particular if the transformation develops as rapidly as it has in East Germany. People have to cope with new situations every day, must adapt to new standards and tackle risks not known to them before. Not all are able to endure this without costs. Resignation and retreat, if not apathy are reactions that are psychologically plausible. Against this background the ISJP had respondents answer two questions relating possible fatalism to social justice: (1) “The way things are these days, it is hard to know what is just anymore” and (2) “There is no point arguing about social justice since it is impossible to change things.”




Figure 4: Fatalism

Results are shown in Figure 4. Notable, first of all, is the trend difference with regard to the hard-to-know-what-is-just item. In 1991 East Germans were completely disoriented with regard to the meaning of justice; they have become more certain in this respect by 1996. In West Germany the opposite trend is visible: There is more uncertainty in 1996 than in 1991. So what we see is that both parts of Germany are drawn closer together in time because easterners become more clear about justice and westerners less. We would venture the interpretation that East Germans, in 1991, felt insecure in their confrontation with the new post-socialist situation, but five years later know better which standards to apply.

In West Germany serious attention should be given to the fact that a changing economic environment has reduced the certainty with which value commitments are made. Normlessness, in an Durkheimian sense, would be overstating the case, but there are clear indications that globalization and the talk of the nearing end of the welfare state in Germany are making their marks.

Looking at the possibility to change things in 1991 the East Germans had the recent experience that it is indeed possible to actively overcome an unjust system. Therefore they reject the idea that things cannot be changed. However, quite clearly this invigorating optimism is gone in 1996. East Germans are disillusioned about the prospect of changing conditions in order to amplify justice. Noteworthy is the extent to which fatalism has grown in East Germany as compared to West Germany where we also find an increase in resignation. All Germans have become more fatalistic but East Germans to a startling extent.

	<i>"It is no use arguing about justice since things cannot be changed"*</i>				<i>"The way things are today, it is hard to know what is just anymore"*</i>			
	East 1991	East 1996	West 1991	West 1996	East 1991	East 1996	West 1991	West 1996
Part of the country	37.7	55.2	35.9	48.2	62.8	52.6	41.9	43.5
Female	40.7	55.1	38.7	48.9	66.2	52.3	47.4	44.1
Male	34.1	55.3	33.2	47.5	58.8	53.1	36.6	42.9
<i>Age groups in 1989</i>								
16 – 24	36.4	56.4	29.4	47.8	55.1	42.1	39.5	40.9
25 – 42	32.8	55.4	31.6	49.2	57.8	52.6	39.5	41.4
43 – 63	40.9	54.9	37.7	47.3	66.6	57.0	42.4	48.8
64 – 89	45.6	60.4	48.1	56.1	75.6	57.6	48.8	48.1
<i>Education (Cassin)</i>								
Lower level	48.1	63.4	48.5	55.9	76.8	65.3	50.8	50.5
Intermediate level	36.4	56.0	32.9	48.3	61.4	50.9	40.4	40.7
Upper level	22.9	44.5	20.1	32.5	43.6	41.9	29.4	33.8
<i>Subjective class</i>								
Upper	35.6	49.0	28.3	46.1	52.4	42.5	33.3	39.4
Middle	38.2	51.1	38.2	44.8	61.9	51.0	42.4	42.2
Lower	37.5	65.3	43.6	58.0	67.3	61.7	55.9	55.6
<i>Employment status</i>								
Self-employed	32.1	58.0	31.4	38.7	62.3	33.8	32.3	32.8
Retired	45.4	58.3	46.9	51.8	73.3	59.4	47.8	53.6
Unemployed	38.6	68.5	38.2	59.2	65.9	64.3	42.4	57.1

\*Percentages of those agreeing strongly and somewhat.

Table 7: Fatalism By Selected Groups

As can be seen from Table 7 the belief that things cannot be changed is more widespread among women than among men. It is also evident, however, that the gender difference in this respect has become smaller. The resignation among men in East as well as in West Germany has

grown more quickly than among women. East Germany's men are obviously more affected by economic distress psychologically than women. From 1991 to 1996, men and women have also come closer together in their agreement that it is difficult to know what is just anymore. There was considerable insecurity about justice values in 1991 in the East German population in general, but women had particularly high scores which, in 1996, are much closer to those of the men. In West Germany value insecurity among women has also decreased, but noteworthy is that West German men have grown in their justice delusion in 1996. This may well be connected to the high unemployment in Germany, which in the western part of the country has affected men to a much higher degree than women.

With respect to age it can be noted that the two oldest age cohorts are especially fatalistic in both of the respects discussed here. It seems that due to their longer socialization in the old system it now becomes especially difficult for them to adapt to the new circumstances and to find orientation. In spite of this high level of fatalism we do find, however, that also old people have adopted a firmer stand on justice during the five years' time interval. With respect to respondents' education we see that the better educated are less fatalistic and that in comparison to the less educated they seem to have a clearer idea what is just. Especially in the East it seems that a higher level of education was favorable to getting acquainted with the new system. Finally, as could be expected, marginalized groups of society – pensioners and unemployed – tend to be more fatalistic than other groups.

**Reward Justice**

**Justice Evaluations of Own Incomes**

If asked not for preferences with regard to justice ideologies but how just they believe their own shares are, individuals immerse into a completely different environment.

They must find a viewpoint now towards the rewards they receive not primarily considering the principles and procedures or ideal distribution regimes they would prefer for society at large. The “justness” of the amounts and the assets themselves stand to be evaluated. This is what the *justice theory of rewards* deals with (Jasso and Wegener 1997). Reward justice is studied within the scope of the following four central questions:

What do individuals and societies think is just and why?

How do ideas about what is just shape the actual reward and the actual reward distribution?

What is the magnitude of the perceived injustice associated with given departures from perfect justice?

What are the behavioral and social consequences of perceived injustice?

The notion of reward justice addressed here is restricted to the *third* question, and hence our discussion is restricted to the operation of the quantities in this question only: the actual reward, the just reward, and the justice evaluation (see Jasso 1989; Jasso and Wegener 1997 for a detailed account).

Individuals form opinions about what constitutes a just reward for a rewardee. The observer’s ideas about what is just may be shaped by considerations involving the rewardee’s reward-relevant characteristics as well as considerations involving the distributional pattern of the reward in a collectivity (Berger et al. 1972; Brickman et al. 1981; Jasso 1983). In most cases the individual will also know what the rewardee’s actual reward is, i. e. corresponding to the just-reward elements there exist actual-reward elements. An example would be the amount of earnings an observer considers just and the actual amount the rewardee receives. Comparing the rewardee’s actual reward, denoted  $A$ , to the just reward, denoted  $C$ , the observer judges whether the rewardee is fairly or unfairly rewarded and, if unfairly rewarded, whether under- or overrewarded and to what degree. The resulting judgment is

called a *justice evaluation* and its assessment constitutes the core of the answer to the third question of justice theory.

Formally, there exists a *justice evaluation function* mapping the actual and the just rewards into the justice evaluation. According to reward justice theory the justice evaluation varies as the logarithm of the ratio of the actual reward to the just reward (Jasso 1978, 1994) so the justice evaluation function may be specified as follows:<sup>1</sup>

$$J = \text{justice evaluation} \propto \ln\left(\frac{\text{actual reward}}{\text{just reward}}\right) = \ln\left(\frac{A}{C}\right)$$

It is often also of interest to calculate a summary measure of the distribution of justice evaluations in a collectivity, and for this purpose we define  $E(J)$  as the arithmetic mean of  $J$ .  $E(J)$  has also been termed the *justice index* (Jasso 1994, 1999). Of course, it may be calculated for subsets of a collectivity, for example, for men and women or East Germans and West Germans separately. One should also keep in mind that justice evaluations may be directed to one’s own rewards or to that of others; they are reflexive in the former and nonreflexive in the latter case. So we can evaluate the justice of our own income, for instance, or that of some other person or occupational group.

If we want to apply the relationship

$$J = \ln\left(\frac{A}{C}\right)$$

from above we of course must have estimates of the actual and the just income either of ourselves or of others, whatever the case may be. In the ISJP of 1991 and 1996 care was taken to estimate justice evaluations with regard to individuals’ income by measuring as precisely as possible respondents’ actual income values as well as just incomes. For the latter the following wording was used: “What income do you feel you deserved from your job (monthly after tax)?” From this information we can easily calculate whether individual respondents feel their income to be a just, an underrewarded or an overrewarded income. Aggregate results are depicted in the lower portion of Figure 5 (the

upper portion of Figure 5 is addressed in the following section).




Figure 5: Justice Evaluation of Own Income and the Justice Gap

In West Germany the mean justice evaluation of one’s own job income (the justice index of income) is only slightly below zero meaning that on average West Germans feel only slightly underrewarded. There is even a small improvement from 1991 to 1996. In the East income justice evaluation is clearly below the western level in 1991; in 1991 the East Germans considered themselves heavily underrewarded.

	Just. evaluation of own income				Justice gap			
	East 1991	East 1996	West 1991	West 1996	East 1991	East 1996	West 1991	West 1996
Part of the country	-.52	-.20	-.15	-.11	.77	.83	.91	.91
Female	-.53	-.21	-.18	-.13	.76	.80	.88	.87
Male	-.51	-.20	-.14	-.10	.78	.86	.94	.95
<i>Age groups in 1989</i>								
16 – 24	-.44	-.24	-.18	-.11	.86	.84	.97	.93
25 – 42	-.10	-.20	-.15	-.12	.67	.82	.91	.89
43 – 63	-.56	-.20	-.15	-.08	.87	.87	.89	.98
64 – 89	-.63	-.14	-.14	-.06	.77	.71	.88	.89
<i>Education (Casmin)</i>								
Lower level	-.52	-.22	-.15	-.15	.86	.88	.93	1.13
Intermediate level	-.47	-.22	-.16	-.10	.75	.78	.85	.71
Upper level	-.67	-.14	-.11	-.06	.73	.88	.86	.87
<i>Subjective class</i>								
Upper	-.52	-.14	-.09	-.07	.77	.66	.81	.70
Middle	-.49	-.02	.00	.02	.70	.87	.90	1.01
Lower	-.57	-.27	-.26	-.29	.87	.89	1.10	1.11
<i>Employment status</i>								
Self-employed	-.57	-.27	-.34	-.14	.55	.60	.75	.82
Retired	-	-	-	-	.78	.81	.92	1.01
Unemployed	-	-	-	-	1.04	1.06	1.36	1.28

Table 8: Justice Evaluations of Own Income and Felt Justice Gaps By Sel. Groups

By 1996 there is much improvement in the justice index approaching almost the western level. However, in comparison to West

Germany in 1996 there is still more injustice felt in the East, but the difference is moderate now. The dramatic reduction in experienced injustice from 1991 to 1996 in East Germany has one obvious reason: the unprecedented rise in incomes that followed unification. This narrowing of the gap between East and West should be compared to the still existing differences in most of the justice ideologies we have looked at.

There are, however, individual and group differences (Table 8, left panel). Women consider themselves generally more underrewarded than men. This can be seen as reflection of their actual situation since in East as well as in West Germany a marked gender income gap exists. However, compared to 1991 women from East Germany seem to have a more favorable justice evaluations of their income in 1996. Moreover it is worth noting that the older cohorts have improved their views on income justice from 1991 to 1996, narrowing the difference in justice evaluations to the West considerably. The same is true for the group of the better educated and the self-employed.

**Reward Justice of Others and Social Inequality Perceptions**

**The Justice Gap**

The concept of justice evaluations gives rise to a variety of other quantities. One of these is the justice evaluation gap or, for short, the *justice gap*, which represents the discrepancy evaluated as just in the relative rewards received by two subgroups of a population (Verwiebe 1999). Examples include the gap thought just in the earnings of men and women, or of incumbents of different occupations, or of an income I have now compared with an income in a previous job. The justice gap is usually expressed as the difference of the justice evaluation of smaller (lower) reward subtracted from that of the larger (upper) reward. A straightforward formulation of the justice gap, denoted *G*, would be:

$$G = E(J_{upper}) - E(J_{lower}).$$

The ISJP provides nonreflexive justice evaluations of the incomes of different occupations, that of a “chairman or managing director of a large corporation” and of an “unskilled worker, such as a factory line worker.” Both occupations were chosen to represent realistic endpoints of the perceived income continuum, the top and the bottom “anchor” (DeSoto and Albrecht 1968). For both, estimates of the actual and the just incomes were supplied by the respondents, hence the respective experienced justice evaluations can be calculated. The justice gap then expresses the felt degree of discrepancy in justice between very high and very low income earners. With respect to the income continuum of a society this is in fact the amount of injustice perceived by the observer and, in the aggregate, the measure of injustice for a given system of inequality.

In the upper portion of Figure 5 justice gap values for East and West Germany in 1991 and 1996 are given, clearly showing, first, that the justice gap in East Germany has become larger from 1991 to 1996, but second that it is still slightly smaller than the justice gap in West Germany that stayed unaltered in the time period. Hence, with respect to measuring injustice we find that the East-West difference is diminishing. In terms of reward justice East Germans are gradually adopting western views.

Again taking a look at the individual effects, in Table 8 (right panel) we see that the justice gap perceived by men is larger than that perceived by women; this is so regardless of time. In East and West men have a more radical feeling towards the justice of inequality. With respect to age there are two age cohorts that perceive a large justice gap and exhibit low justice evaluations of their own income at the same time. These are the cohorts of 16 to 24 and of 43 to 63 years (at time of unification). These two cohorts are in fact those who must be considered to be the main losers of reunification. The first, since it was difficult to integrate the young into the

labor force at all because of rising unemployment throughout the transformation period; the second cohort, stamped “the lost generation of the middle ages” (Geißler 1996), was usually too old for the newly created jobs. If they became unemployed they were almost certainly forced to end their careers.

With respect to class we find that especially those in the lower stratum of society see a large justice gap. Also in terms of the justice evaluations of their own incomes this group tends to feel underrewarded, in particular in 1991 when most other groups in East Germany felt underrewarded as well. But it should be emphasized that like the feeling of injustice of one’s own income, the perceived justice gap within East and West Germany, respectively, has become smaller over the time period we study.

### Perceptions of Social Inequality

Justice judgments are always based on how the social world is perceived by those who make the judgments (Wegener 1990). In this context the perception of social inequality in a society is of special importance (Jasso and Wegener 1997). A straightforward measure of perceived social inequality is that respondents give their estimates of how many “poor” people and, equivalently, how many “rich” people society has. In the ISJP this was assessed as the percentages of estimated poor, defining poor persons as those who have “barely enough food and shelter but are not able to buy much else for themselves, and those who do not have even that.” Conversely, rich individuals were characterized as those “who have enough to buy themselves almost anything.” In both ISJP waves, German respondents were asked to give their estimates of poverty and wealth as percentages relative to the part of Germany they lived in, so East Germans gave the percentage of poor (rich) people thought to be existing in East Germany, West Germans in West Germany.




Figure 6: Perceived Percentage of the Rich and the Poor

Figure 6 summarizes these results. Striking is first of all that in East Germany the percentage of the poor is considered to be much larger than that of the rich. The opposite is true for West Germany: West Germans conceive the proportion of the West German population that is rich as larger than that which is poor. Also the development over time of these estimates is different in both parts of Germany. In East Germany the poor-percentage grew from 1991 to 1996 while the rich-percentage decreased. In West Germany we observe a reduction in the percentage of the rich, whereas the percentage of the poor remains more or less unchanged. Note also that West Germans generally think that there are more rich West Germans than East Germans think that there are rich East Germans, but that East Germans believe that there are more poor people in East Germany than West Germans think that there are in West Germany. Over time, finally, we see a widening gap between perceived poverty and wealth in the East and a closing gap in the West.

It seems that the subjective impressions of social inequality in East and West Germany do in part reflect the given realities in both parts of the country. In East Germany the percentage of poor is thought to be high because of the unemployment rate which had reached a historic magnitude in 1996 and also because of the existing wage differences with West Germany. Thus the

change in perception follows the negative development of their situation that is objectively taking place.

West Germany, in contrast, has been experiencing a difficult economic situation since 1990 resulting in the impression that wealth is more difficult to acquire – thus there are fewer rich people. But due to the functioning safety net of the German welfare state, the percentage of poor people is not thought to be affected that much. As we have seen from Table 2, however, there is indication that poverty did in fact rise since 1990, not only in the East but in the West as well. Noteworthy is also that, in absolute measures, there is less poverty in East Germany than in the West (Table 2). We must conclude therefore that the objective facts are overestimated in the East and underestimated in the West. On the other hand, there is evidence that East Germans tend to base their judgments on West German standards (Wegner and Steinmann 1995; Walz and Brunner 1997). We must also consider that the poverty definitions used in Table 2 are based on the mean incomes of East Germany for the East and on mean incomes of West Germany for the West, meaning – per definition – that those East Germans who are considered poor have less money available than the West German poor. Thus there is much objectivity in the judgments of the East Germans when they report their impression of the percentage of poor people in East Germany.

Looking at the influence of respondent characteristics on the perception of the percentages of rich and poor, results in Table 9 show that women consider the percentage of poor to be higher than men. They seem to be more sensitive towards social inequality. With respect to age there is not such a clear picture. It appears, however, that the very young as well as the oldest group consider the percentage of rich and poor to be highest. The same applies to people with a lower education compared to persons with higher levels of education, and to those who consider themselves members of the lower class.

	"What percentage of the people in [East/West] Germany are poor?"				"What percentage of the people in [East/West] Germany are rich?"			
	East 1991	East 1996	West 1991	West 1996	East 1991	East 1996	West 1991	West 1996
Part of the country	18.0	19.9	15.0	15.1	14.5	10.6	25.2	19.1
Female	19.6	20.8	17.2	14.6	15.6	11.2	28.2	19.9
Male	16.3	19.0	13.0	15.8	13.3	10.0	22.3	18.2
<i>Age groups in 1989</i>								
16 - 24	20.5	20.8	14.8	15.2	15.9	10.4	26.2	20.1
25 - 42	18.5	20.0	15.8	15.1	16.4	10.3	24.0	17.6
43 - 63	17.2	19.5	14.4	14.2	14.6	10.9	25.5	19.7
64 - 89	15.9	21.0	14.6	17.4	17.1	11.3	26.7	21.9
<i>Education (Casmin)</i>								
Lower level	19.3	20.5	16.3	16.0	18.5	11.7	28.1	21.3
Intermediate level	18.1	20.9	15.3	15.3	14.0	11.2	25.2	18.7
Upper level	15.3	17.1	12.9	13.3	9.9	8.2	21.0	15.9
<i>Subjective class</i>								
Upper	15.8	16.6	13.6	13.3	17.5	8.5	24.2	18.4
Middle	17.6	19.7	14.8	15.1	14.4	10.9	25.1	18.4
Lower	19.1	23.2	18.1	16.2	13.7	11.8	27.6	19.9
<i>Employment status</i>								
Self-employed	18.2	16.4	15.7	14.1	11.8	10.4	23.4	15.1
Retired	16.3	20.5	15.3	16.4	16.5	11.4	26.0	22.2
Unemployed	22.3	23.4	18.5	17.9	15.3	10.5	26.4	18.2

Table 9: Percentages of the Rich and the Poor By Selected Groups

However there is an interesting result for the Eastern part of the country in 1991 with respect to the percentage of the rich: The upper class considers the percentage of rich to be higher than the lower class. It seems in 1991 that the traditional pattern of the upper classes tending to *underestimate* the number of rich in a society in order to self-enhance their own position subjectively (DeSoto and Albrecht 1968; Wegener 1987; 1992a) is a mechanism that was not fully in place in East Germany in 1991. Five years later, however, the better-off in East Germany have acquired the status perception of their class believing that only 8 ½ percent of the population are rich. Note, however, that lower class respondents estimate about 12 percent of the East Germans to be rich whereas West Germans believe that there are 18 to 20 percent rich in West Germany. Even though the rich-percentage of the West went down considerably from 1991 to 1996, these figures seem to reflect the objective distribution of wealth between both parts of the country. There are several reasons why there are wealthy and poor people in a society. By and large it seems plausible to group the possible explanations into two categories: On the one hand there are causes *external* to the individual that is either wealthy or poor. For poverty external causes may be bad luck, prejudice and discrimination

against certain groups, lack of equal opportunity, or the failure of the economic system; these are circumstances of course from which the wealthy will gain. To be distinguished from external are *internal* causes, i. e. causes for which the affected persons themselves are responsible. In the case of poverty internal reasons may be lack of ability or talent, lack of diligence and effort, or even loose morals and a lack of discipline. In order to get an idea of what attributions respondents made when thinking about the reasons for poverty and wealth in Germany the ISJP asked them to give their judgments about "how often each of the following factors (was) a reason why there are poor (rich) people in East/West Germany today."

For poverty the following reasons were offered: "Lack of ability and talent," "bad luck," "loose morals and drunkenness," "lack of effort," "prejudice and discrimination against certain groups," "lack of equal opportunity," "failure of the economic system." Reasons for wealth were given as: "ability or talent," "luck," "dishonesty," "hard work," "having the right connections," "more opportunities to begin with," "the economic system allows to take unfair advantage." Using a technique called factor analysis,<sup>2</sup> we grouped these explanations into two sets of factors for both wealth and poverty: "external causes" and "internal causes."<sup>3</sup>

Starting with East Germany first, we note that there are remarkable changes over time in the internal and external attributions and that the changes in the internal attribution of poverty and wealth both run approximately parallel, the same being true for the external causes.

There is clear indication that the external reasons have increased from 1991 to 1996 and the internal decreased, regardless of whether poverty or richness is considered. Characteristics of the economic system, unequal opportunities and discrimination are made responsible for high levels of poverty and wealth. Hard work and effort, or failure to invest both, talent or resistance against moral incertitude are less often

seen as responsible for success or failure, respectively. In a nutshell, East Germans essentially blame the system.




Figure 7: Explanations for Wealth and Poverty

Looking at West Germany we see that external explanations come to be more favored here too, but the level is lower than that of internal explanations. This means that in the West it is more common to consider poverty and wealth to be the result of lacking effort or exceptional performance, respectively, than it is in the East. Only wealth, in 1996, is well explained also by external causes in West Germany. Overall then these results show that the attribution attitudes of East Germans are more critical of the social order than those of West Germans, if “critical” here means that people tend to blame the system. West Germans are quicker in making the individual responsible for his or her fate, though in the five year interval under study “externalism” has grown.

Of course we again have two possible interpretations for the difference in the internal and external attribution styles. On the one hand this difference could be due to socialization: inhabitants of the former German Democratic Republic being accustomed to a strong state, while post-war West Germans grew up in a market society based on the individual and individual entrepreneurship. But we must not dismiss easily the “situational” possibility: that the results are reflections of the transformation

process that has frustrated people greatly, especially in East Germany. There is a feeling among East Germans of standing on the losing side and being objects, if not victims of unification.

**Legitimization Beliefs and Individual Satisfaction**

**Trust in Institutions and the Government**

Given the changes in the lives of East Germans brought about by transformation it seems imperative to ask how trustworthy they find the new institutions and the political system (Bauer 1991; Weil 1993). Trust in political institutions is often assessed by asking respondents to evaluate the executive, legislative and judicial functions of the political system separately. In the ISJP the three standard statements with regard to which the extent of approval was measured were: (1) “Public officials don’t care much about what people like me think,” (2) “In elections in unified Germany, voters have a real choice” and (3) “In the unified Germany a poor person has the same chance of a fair trial as a wealthy person does.”<sup>4</sup>




Figure 8: Trust in Institutions

The first thing that is striking about Figure 8 in which results for 1991 and 1996 are summarized is the almost identical representation we find for East and West Germany. The statement that at elections there

are real alternatives – the legislative component – finds the highest approval in both parts of Germany with somewhat higher acceptance in 1991 in East Germany.

The latter is probably due to idealistic ideas about the newly won democratic freedom after forty years in which elections were certainly not free. Altogether in 1991 there is a high level of trust in the legislative branch as a means of promoting individual interests in both parts of the country. However, trust decreases sharply in 1996 in both parts of Germany. In East Germany disillusion has grown regarding the possibilities of actively participating in the political process after hopes were high in the early period of unification. In addition people were increasingly worn down by the immobility of the conservative political style of the Kohl government that was averse to public participation. This explanation holds especially for West Germany.

	"Pub. offic. don't care what people think"*				"In elect. voters do not have a real choice"*				"Poor have the same chance for a fair trial"*			
	East 1991	East 1996	West 1991	West 1996	East 1991	East 1996	West 1991	West 1996	East 1991	East 1996	West 1991	West 1996
Part of country	15.1	17.6	17.6	16.1	75.7	47.3	67.6	44.3	31.1	12.3	35.5	23.5
Female	13.8	16.3	17.0	15.4	76.6	47.7	64.8	43.7	31.3	12.0	32.8	24.5
Male	16.6	19.1	18.2	17.0	74.8	46.8	70.2	44.9	30.9	12.6	38.1	22.5
<i>Age groups in 1989</i>												
16 - 24	17.0	16.5	18.0	11.2	61.9	40.1	54.5	36.4	28.5	11.9	31.0	19.8
25 - 42	14.8	21.3	18.2	19.8	74.5	45.6	63.6	43.0	26.4	13.3	31.8	25.3
43 - 63	14.8	15.0	17.8	17.3	80.5	51.5	75.3	51.7	34.1	11.3	39.2	25.3
64 - 89	15.1	16.3	15.2	10.4	80.6	46.0	74.3	44.9	41.4	12.0	41.0	21.1
<i>Education (Casmin)</i>												
Lower level	13.8	11.1	14.8	12.3	81.0	46.3	71.8	45.3	38.2	10.1	36.9	23.3
Intermed. level	14.4	18.6	18.1	18.3	75.3	46.7	65.3	41.7	30.1	10.3	33.5	20.6
Upper level	19.7	22.4	22.2	20.0	68.3	50.4	65.4	46.4	21.7	17.8	34.7	28.0
<i>Subjective class</i>												
Upper	15.1	20.0	20.0	21.7	78.3	59.6	73.0	54.2	34.6	18.0	38.9	26.3
Middle	14.4	18.9	14.9	13.1	77.0	46.3	67.3	38.3	35.2	12.9	36.5	23.3
Lower	15.7	14.5	18.1	12.9	73.7	38.5	60.9	40.0	25.5	7.1	26.9	19.5
<i>Employment status</i>												
Self-employed	15.1	30.0	22.1	24.2	75.5	50.7	71.8	45.1	27.4	22.9	33.0	32.3
Retired	13.8	13.6	13.7	13.8	79.8	49.0	74.9	50.2	37.8	10.3	39.6	20.1
Unemployed	14.6	12.1	20.6	12.0	66.3	35.0	73.5	40.8	23.5	6.0	38.2	26.0

\*Percentages of those agreeing strongly and somewhat.

Table 10: Trust in Institutions By Selected Groups.

Trust in the legal system is much lower than in the legislature; it even lost ground from 1991 to 1996. In 1996 East Germans were particularly skeptical about fairness in courts. This must be seen against the background of the many trials against former East German officials after unification

and the feeling among many East Germans that justice is not only "imperfect" (Markovits 1995) but that there is even a "justice of the victorious" in operation (Sa'adah 1998). While in 1991 trust with regard to the executive is lowest in both parts of the country in East Germany trust in the fairness of trials has become even lower by 1996.

Women trust politicians less than men do (Table 10). The better educated also tend to be skeptical about politicians working for the interests of the people. With respect to age the cohort that puts most trust in officials is the 25 to 42 age group. This applies to both parts of Germany in 1991 and in 1996. This age group was in the middle of their working lives in 1989 and, particularly in East Germany, they were a generation profiting from unification. The two older age groups, however, think about the chances of fair trials more positively. While in 1991 especially the less educated believed in fair trials, in 1996 the higher educated share this belief. It seems that the original euphoria about possible changes was disappointed especially among the lower educated. With regard to class position we see that upper class members tend to believe in the commitment of politicians, the usefulness of elections as well as in the fairness of trials. Hence system legitimacy is higher among those who occupy high positions in the social hierarchy. The same applies to retired and self-employed persons.




Figure 9: Trust in Government

One exception is the statement about trials that is approved less often by the retired in 1996 and more strongly by self-employed. We find that the unemployed have generally a low level of confidence in all three branches.

Figure 9 displays the mean answers to the standard trust in government items the ISJP used: (1) “How much of the time do you think you can trust the federal government in Bonn to do what is right?” and (2) “How much of the time do you think the federal government in Bonn is run for the benefit of all the people?” From Figure 9 it is obvious that respondents in East and West have growing distrust in the federal government – Helmut Kohl’s conservative-liberal coalition government – from 1991 to 1996. There is increasing dissatisfaction with the long reign of the conservatives in West Germany and frustration about broken promises regarding the swift recovery of the East. It may well be, therefore, that East and West Germans are unhappy with the government for quite different reasons, but they are unified by their discontent with it.

Apart from the trust people have in particular political institutions and the government they can also vary in the degree of satisfaction with the political system in general. In view of the political transformation in East Germany this is an important measure for the acceptance of democracy in this part of the country. Moreover there is a crucial time perspective: How satisfied with the political system were respondents under the “old” political rule, how satisfied are they now, and how satisfied do they think they will be in the years to come.

As Figure 10 shows satisfaction with the political system in East and West Germany went down from 1991 to 1996. The decline in satisfaction is clearly an expression of the belief that the political system in Germany was inadequately prepared to handle the problems of unification.

For future satisfaction respondents in 1991 and 1996 were asked to give satisfaction estimates for “three years from now.” Also

in terms of prospective beliefs there is a decrease in satisfaction. East Germans in particular are much more pessimistic about future developments in 1996 than in 1991. Their high flying hopes directly after unification have been replaced by more realistic views bringing the level of expected satisfaction very near to their actual satisfaction with the political system.




Figure 10: Past, Present and Future Satisfaction with the Political System

In the 1996 survey (not in 1991) the ISJP included a question asking for the retrospective report of system satisfaction before 1989. For East Germans this meant the communist system, but for comparison purposes the question was also asked in West Germany. The interesting result is that seven years after unification the values in the two parts of Germany diverge sharply. In East Germany satisfaction with the former system is considered to be marginally higher than present satisfaction. However both values are clearly negative (i. e. below the mean value of 4.0). In contrast to that West Germans think that the political system in the time before 1989 was significantly better than the present situation.

So it seems that the West Germans are to a much greater extent subjects to collective nostalgia than the East Germans, a finding that stands in sharp contrast to the west German self-perception. It is them and not the East Germans that eulogize the “good old days” – those of the old Federal Re-

public before unification or, since the political system as such did not change, the old Federal Republic without financial transfers, new frontiers, new countrymen, different “eastern” mentalities, and new responsibilities in foreign policy.

**Individual Satisfaction**

Figure 11 describes peoples’ satisfaction with their lives as a whole, past, present and in the future. In both parts of Germany the present as well as the future satisfaction dropped between 1991 and 1996. However, the satisfaction is much lower in the East, and this is so at both points in time. Again this reflects that the problems of unification and transformation are particularly present in this part of the country. The disillusion caused by dealing with the new system and the process of learning how to cope with a market economy make life difficult and strenuous for most East Germans.




Figure 11: Past, Present and Future Satisfaction with One’s Life as a Whole

However, it appears that also in West Germany disillusion about the poor economic prospects, the costs of unification and their non-calculable consequences prevail making people feel less satisfied than in 1991. Most impressive is that East Germans have the recollection that they were more satisfied with their lives before 1989. West Germans do not remember being more satisfied in 1989 than in 1996.

Table 11 reveals that with respect to satisfaction about life as a whole there are only marginal differences between the sexes, though women were somewhat more satisfied in 1991 than men.

*“How satisfied are you with your life as a whole?”\*s*

	East 1991	East 1996	West 1991	West 1996
Part of the country	43.2	30.7	62.4	44.2
Female	44.9	31.3	62.2	44.0
Male	41.1	30.1	62.6	44.3
<i>Age groups in 1989</i>				
16 – 24	48.1	33.8	58.3	41.9
25 – 42	43.5	30.2	65.5	48.3
43 – 63	42.2	27.0	61.5	45.3
64 – 89	40.5	38.5	60.2	32.7
<i>Education (Casmin)</i>				
Lower level	38.2	24.5	56.3	36.3
Intermediate level	44.8	30.4	66.9	51.5
Upper level	47.5	38.6	67.2	50.2
<i>Subjective class</i>				
Upper	54.2	52.6	73.7	56.4
Middle	50.7	29.0	62.7	42.7
Lower	30.1	17.0	44.1	22.8
<i>Employment status</i>				
Self-employed	50.0	52.1	60.2	46.8
Retired	40.8	29.1	58.9	40.6
Unemployed	29.2	11.0	32.4	17.6

\*Percentages of the highly satisfied

Table 11: Satisfaction With Life As a Whole By Selected Groups

We note that in 1996 East Germans in the age group of 64 to 89 are most satisfied. This group can be considered to be among the winners of unification because of the advantageous pension schemes introduced to East Germany after unification. It is also evident that the higher educated and members of higher classes are more satisfied with their lives than are the self-employed and the retired. Unemployment, of course, contributes little to satisfaction of one’s life.

**Conclusions**

Looking at East Germany the overall impression is that unification has left Germans in this part of the country in depression and full of pessimism, in spite the fact that they have just won democracy. In the year directly following unification, in 1991, hopes were high and, judging from the endorsement of western market values then observable, the new order was welcomed with few reservations. There were individual differences to be sure: older people in particular were not prepared yet

to give up the socialist convictions they had been brought up with and which had accompanied them into successful careers in many cases. But in the beginning there was widely spread optimism and joy over having arrived in a free market society. Over the interval of five years, however, from 1991 to 1996, a general backlash is observable. As most of our measured variables show, approval and satisfaction have been on the retreat. It seems as if people had overshot the goal in the euphoria of the beginning and are now gradually working their way back to a normal level. It is true that they want individual responsibility and liberalism, but not too much. They also think the state should be an equalizing mediator, but within limits. And led by idealistic standards in the beginning, satisfaction with politics and democratic institutions has fallen back into modest proportions. Part of normality is also that satisfaction with one's private life is voiced in low-key only, and that not too much hope is invested in the future.

If this is the quintessential story to be told about East Germany's recent past the question nevertheless comes to mind, what "normal" means. Inasmuch as this question can be given an answer at all, we can try to find such an answer by looking at West Germany, implying that what we find there – in terms of system approval, justice beliefs and satisfaction – is, for an industrial western democracy, "normal." The findings reported here do indeed lend support to the thesis that East Germany has, after seven years of unity, grown similar to the West with respect to many of the issues considered. From the national point of view as well as in view of the prerequisites for a stable society, this is good news, giving truth to Willy Brandt's famed prophecy in 1989 that now "that which belongs together, will grow together."

But at closer inspection our data do not support this optimistic conclusion without qualification. We must draw a line between the different types of attitudes and values that we focus on, and we must also be careful not to lose sight of the problem of

where these attitudes and values originate. Are they products of socialization or spontaneous reactions to the facts of transformation? Most important in this respect is the distinction between justice ideologies and reward justice. What can be said – *cum grano salis* – is that the justice ideologies we have analyzed tend *not* to "grow together" in East and West (Wegener 1999; Liebig and Verwiebe 2000). It is still true that, for instance, West Germans are more individualistic, less egalitarian and less state oriented ("etatistic") than East Germans. Also the level of fatalism remains higher in the East than in the West.

There are two comments that must be made vis-à-vis this finding. First, West Germans have undergone changes from 1991 to 1996 as well. Transformation is not only affecting the East. Many of the justice ideologies prove to be far from stable in West Germany. There may be different reasons for this: the lagging economy, mass unemployment, and the enormous transfer payments of roughly 200 billion German marks per year to the East. These facts were apt to stretch solidarity feelings to the utmost. So in some of the justice ideologies and political legitimization items we find that East Germans have moved closer to the level of West Germans, but as the latter altered their opinions from 1991 to 1996 as well the differences in attitudes have not ceased to exist. The approval of egalitarian measures is a good example (Figure 2): In 1991 East Germans were much more in favor of distribution according to need than West Germans; in 1996 their support dropped to the West German level, but West Germans changed their views towards need as distribution principle as well supporting need in 1996 even less. Hence there is still a significant difference in support for need between East and West Germany, but on a lower level.

The fact that there is so much change in only five years makes it not very likely that the justice ideologies were formed during socialization and that they are due to differences in the political culture of East and

West Germany's post World War II era. While the still existing differences quite clearly mirror the ideological preferences of communism and a market economy in the East and in the West, respectively, the modification in strength they evince during the five year interval prove them to be sensitive to external conditions, meaning that they were not fixed permanently through socialization. This is a finding having optimistic implications: If we do find that much change in such a short time, East and West Germans will have not much difficulties moving even closer together in their justice beliefs in the near future.

The other comment on why there are East-West differences dwells on the distinction between justice ideologies and reward justice. While we have seen that there are ideology differences that persist, Germans are much closer together with respect to questions of reward justice. In contrast to justice ideologies, perceptions of reward justice are governed to a large extent by objective facts that individuals assess relatively distortion-free. If there are perceptual biases they can be shown to result from different status positions individuals have, not from country-differences or national and cultural specifics. So we suggest that the perceptions of justice evaluations

of income, that of the justice gap and the estimated percentages of poor and rich people, reflect real conditions more than ideological prejudice. Reward justice, not justice ideologies, may therefore be the more reliable measure to assess the extent to which East and West Germany have "grown together."

### **Endnotes**

<sup>1</sup> The log-ratio function has many good properties, which have been extensively described by Jasso (1978, 1996); see also Wagner and Berger (1985).

<sup>2</sup> We used confirmatory factor analysis. In Figure 7 we report mean factor scores of the two varimax rotated solutions.

<sup>3</sup> In both cases "luck" was left out after exploratory analyses since this item tended to load on a third, hybrid factor. This result is in accordance with new findings in the external-internal control expectation literature where luck is an autonomous way of attributing the causes of one's fate to the environment (Hoff and Hohner 1992).

<sup>4</sup> Variables are recoded so that positive values express positive opinions.

### ***Appendix: List of Variables and Question Wordings***

#### **Individualism\***

- (1) There is an incentive for individual effort only if differences in income are large enough.
- (2) It is all right if businessmen make good profits because everyone benefits in the end.
- (3) People would not want to take extra responsibility at work unless they were paid extra for it.
- (4) People who work hard deserve to earn more than those who do not.

#### **Egalitarianism\***

- (1) The fairest way of distributing wealth and income would be to give everyone equal shares.
- (2) It's fair if people have more money or wealth, but only if there are equal opportunities.
- (3) People are entitled to pass on their wealth to their children.
- (4) The most important thing is that people get what they need, even if that means allocating money from those who have earned more than they need.

#### **Etatism\***

- (1) The government should guarantee everyone a minimum standard of living.
- (2) The government should place an upper limit on the amount of money any one

person can make.

- (3) The government should provide a job for everyone who wants one.

#### **Fatalism\***

- (1) There is no point arguing about social justice since it is impossible to change things.
- (2) The way things are these days, it is hard to know what is just anymore.

#### **Income Inequality**

- (1) What do you think about the differences in income people have in your part of the country? Are the differences much too large, somewhat too large, about right, somewhat too small or much too small?
- (2) Thinking about income differences in general, across all kinds of jobs: do you believe the income differences in the Western/ Eastern part of the country are much too large, somewhat too large, about right, somewhat too small or much too small?

#### **Trust in Politics and Democracy\***

- (1) Public officials don't care much what people like me think.
- (2) In elections in Germany, voters have a real choice.
- (3) In Germany a poor person has the same chance of a fair trial as a wealthy person does.

(4) How much of the time do you think you can trust the federal government in Bonn to do what is right?

(5) How much of the time do you think the federal government in Bonn is run for the benefit of the people?

**Satisfaction**<sup>†</sup>

(1) How satisfied are you with the political system in Germany?

(2) Now thinking back to 1998, the time before system change: How satisfied were you with the political system in the former GDR/FRG?

(3) Thinking about the future: How satisfied do you think you will be with the political system in Germany three years from now?

(4) All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole?

(5) Now thinking back to 1998, the time before system change: All things considered, how satisfied were you with your life as a whole?

(6) Thinking about the future: All things considered, how satisfied will you be with your life as a whole three years from now?

\* Response categories: strongly disagree, somewhat disagree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat agree, strongly agree.

† Response categories from 1 to 7 with 1 = completely dissatisfied, 4 = neutral, 7 = completely satisfied.

## References

- Abercrombie, N., S. Hill and B. S. Turner 1990. *Dominant Ideologies*. London: Allen and Unwin.
- Bauer, P. 1991. Politische Orientierungen im Übergang. Eine Analyse politischer Einstellungen der Bürger in West- und Ostdeutschland 1990/1991. *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 43: 433-53.
- Berger, J., M. Zelditch, B. Anderson and B. P. Cohen 1972. Structural Aspects of Distributive Justice. A Status Value Formulation. S. 119-46 in J. Berger, M. Zelditch and B. Anderson (eds.), *Sociological Theories in Progress*. Volume 2. New York: Houghton Mifflin.
- Brickman, P., R. Folger, E. Goode, and Y. Schul 1981. Micro and Macro Justice. Pp. 173-202 in Lerner, M. J., and S. C. Lerner (eds.), *The Justice Motive in Social Behavior*. New York: Plenum.
- Brunner, W., and D. Walz 1998. Selbstidentifikation der Ostdeutschen 1990-1997. Warum sich die Ostdeutschen zwar als "Bürger 2. Klasse" fühlen, wir aber nicht auf die innere Mauer treffen. Pp. 229-50 in H. Meulemann (ed.), *Werte und nationale Identität im vereinten Deutschland. Erklärungsansätze der Umfrageforschung*. Opladen: Leske + Budrich.
- Christoph, B., G. Jardin, B. Lippl, G. Stark and B. Wegener 1998. Dokumentation für den deutschen Teil des International Social Justice Project. Replikation 1996. ISJP Technical Report no. 37, Berlin.
- DeSoto, C. B., and F. Albrecht 1968. Cognition and Social Ordering. Pp. 531-38 in R. Abelson and E. Aronson (eds.), *Theories of Cognitive Consistency*. Chicago: Rand McNally.
- Diewald, M., and K. U. Mayer (eds.) 1996. Zwischenbilanz der Wiedervereinigung. Strukturwandel und Mobilität im Transformationsprozeß. Opladen: Leske + Budrich.
- DIW 1998. Gesamtwirtschaftliche und unternehmerische Anpassungsfortschritte in Ostdeutschland. Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin: *Wochenbericht* no. 33.
- Douglas, M. 1982. *In the Active Voice*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Eisen, A., and H. Wollmann 1996. Institutionenbildung in Ostdeutschland. Zwischen externer Steuerung und Eigendynamik. Pp. 15-29 in A. Eisen and H. Wollmann (eds.), *Institutionenbildung in Ostdeutschland*. Opladen: Leske + Budrich.
- Elster, J., C. Offe and U. Preuss 1998. *Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies. Rebuilding the Ship at Sea*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
- Geißler, R. 1996. Von der realsozialistischen zur sozialstaatlichen Struktur der sozialen Ungleichheit. Umbrüche im ostdeutschen Ungleichheitsgefüge. Pp. 289-302 in M. Diewald and K. U. Mayer (eds.), *Zwischenbilanz der Wiedervereinigung. Strukturwandel und Mobilität im Transformationsprozeß*. Opladen: Leske + Budrich.
- Gensicke, T. 1996. Sozialer Wandel durch Modernisierung, Individualisierung und Wertewandel. *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* B 42: 3-17.
- Hauser, R. 1995. Das empirische Bild der Armut in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland – ein Überblick. *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* B31/32: 3-13.
- Hauser, R. 1998. Armutsberichtserstattung – Pro und Contra. *Sozialer Fortschritt* 47: 159-64.
- Hauser, R., and G. Wagner 1997. Die Einkommensverteilung in Ostdeutschland: Darstellung und Determinanten im Vergleich zu Westdeutschland für die Jahre 1990 bis 1994. Pp. 11-61 in W. Glatzer and G. Kleinhenz (eds.), *Wohlstand für alle?* Opladen: Leske + Budrich.

- Heering, W., and K. Schroeter 1995. Transformationsprozesse in ostdeutschen Unternehmen. Akteursbezogene Studien zur ökonomischen und sozialen Entwicklung in den neuen Bundesländern. Berlin: Akademie Verlag.
- Hoff, E. H., and H. U. Hohner 1992. *Methoden zur Erfassung von Kontrollbewußtsein*. Max Planck Institute for Human Development: Materialien aus der Bildungsforschung 43.
- ISJP 1998a. International Social Justice Project. The Complete Codebook of the Trend Dataset 1991-1996. ISJP Technical Report no. 51, Berlin.
- ISJP 1998b. International Social Justice Project. Codebook of the Trend Dataset 1991-1996, Country Specific Codebook for East and West Germany. ISJP Technical Report no. 53, Berlin.
- Jahresgutachten 1997. Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung. Jahresgutachten 1997. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.
- Jasso, G. 1978. On the Justice of Earnings: A New Specification of the Justice Evaluation Function. *American Journal of Sociology* 83: 1398-1419.
- Jasso, G. 1983. Fairness of Individual Rewards and Fairness of the Reward Distribution: Specifying the Inconsistency Between the Micro and Macro Principles of Justice. *Social Psychology Quarterly* 46: 185-199.
- Jasso, G. 1989. The Theory of the Distributive-Justice Force in Human Affairs: Analyzing the Three Central Questions. Pp. 354-87 in Berger, J., M. Zelditch and B. Anderson (eds.), *Sociological Theories in Progress: New Formulations*. Newbury Park, California: Sage.
- Jasso, G. 1994. Assessing Individual and Group Differences in the Sense of Justice: Framework and Application to Gender Differences in Judgments of the Justice of Earnings. *Social Science Research* 23: 368-406.
- Jasso, G. 1996. Exploring the Reciprocal Relations Between Theoretical and Empirical Work. *Sociological Methods and Research* 24: 253-303.
- Jasso, G. 1999. How Much Injustice is There in the World? Two New Justice Indexes. *American Sociological Review* 64: 133-68.
- Jasso, G., and B. Wegener 1997. Methods for Empirical Justice Analysis: Part I. Framework, Models, and Quantities. *Social Justice Research* 10: 393-430.
- Kaase, M. 1993. Innere Einheit. Pp. 372-82 in W. Weidenfeld and K.-R. Korte (eds.), *Handbuch zur deutschen Einheit*, Frankfurt/M: Campus.
- König, W., P. Lüttinger, and W. Müller 1988. A Comparative Analysis of the Development and Structure of Educational Systems. CASMIN Project, Institut für Sozialwissenschaften, University of Mannheim.
- Kohli, M. 1994. Die DDR als Arbeitsgesellschaft? Arbeit, Lebenslauf und soziale Differenzierung. Pp. 31-61 in H. Kaelble, J. Kocka and H. Zwahr (eds.), *Sozialgeschichte der DDR*. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.
- Krause, P. 1995. Ostdeutschland fünf Jahre nach der Einheit: Rückgang der Erwerbsbeteiligung scheint gestoppt, Einkommen gleichen sich an, Armut stagniert. Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin: *Wochenbericht* no. 50.
- Lehmbruch, G. 1994. Institutionen, Interessen und sektorale Variationen in der Transformationsdynamik der politischen Ökonomie Ostdeutschlands. *Journal für Sozialforschung* 34: 21-44.
- Leibfried, S., and L. Leisering 1995. *Zeit der Armut. Lebensläufe im Sozialstaat*. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp.
- Lepsius, R. 1995. Institutionenanalyse und Institutionenpolitik. Pp. 392-403 in B. Nedelmann (ed.), *Politische Institutionen im Wandel*. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Liebig, S., and R. Verwiebe 2000. Ostdeutsche Einstellungen zur sozialen Ungleichheit: Plädoyer für eine doppelte Vergleichsperspektive. To appear in

- Zeitschrift für Soziologie* 1/2000 (ISJP Technical Report no. 49, Berlin).
- Maier, C. S. 1997. *Dissolution. The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Markovits, I. 1995. *Imperfect Justice. An East-West German Diary*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Meulemann, H. 1996. Werte und Wertewandel. Zur Identität einer geteilten und wieder vereinten Nation. Weinheim: Juventa.
- Nickel, H. M. 1995. Frauen im Umbruch der Gesellschaft. Die zweifache Transformation in Deutschland und ihre ambivalenten Folgen. *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* B 36-37: 23-33.
- Nickel, H. M. 1997. Der Transformationsprozeß in Ost- und Westdeutschland und seine Folgen für das Geschlechterverhältnis. *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* B 51: 20-29.
- Offe, C. 1994. Der Tunnel am Ende des Lichts. Erkundungen der politischen Transformation im Neuen Osten. Frankfurt/M.: Campus.
- Pollack, D. 1997. Das Bedürfnis nach sozialer Anerkennung. Der Wandel der Akzeptanz von Demokratie und Marktwirtschaft in Ostdeutschland. *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* B13: 3-14.
- Pollack, D., and G. Pickel 1998. Die ostdeutsche Identität – Erbe des DDR-Sozialismus oder Produkt der Wiedervereinigung? *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* B 41-42: 9-23.
- Rawls, J. 1971. *A Theory of Justice*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Reißig, R. 1997a. Sozialwissenschaften und Transformation – eine kritische Analyse. *BISS public* 7: 5-39.
- Reißig, R. 1997b. Der ostdeutsche Transformationsfall: Prämissen – Bilanzen – Schlußfolgerungen. *BISS public* 7: 41-58.
- Roller, E. 1997. Sozialpolitische Orientierungen nach der deutschen Vereinigung. Pp. 115-46 in O. Gabriel (ed.), *Politische Orientierungen und Verhaltensweisen im vereinigten Deutschland*. Opladen: Leske + Budrich.
- Rose, R., W. Zapf, W. Seifert and E. Page 1993. *Germans in Comparative Perspective*. Studies in Public Policy 218. Glasgow.
- Rose, R., and C. Haerpfer 1996. The Impact of the Ready-Made State. Die privilegierte Position Ostdeutschlands in der postkommunistischen Transformation. Pp. 105-40 in H. Weisenthal (ed.), *Einheit als Privileg. Vergleichende Perspektiven auf die Transformation Ostdeutschlands*. Frankfurt/M: Campus.
- Sa'adah, A. 1998. *Germany's Second Chance. Trust, Justice, and Democratization*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Sen, A. 1997. *On Economic Inequality*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- StaBA 1997. Statistisches Bundesamt, Datenreport 1997. Zahlen und Fakten über die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung.
- StaBA 1998. Statistisches Bundesamt, Statistisches Jahrbuch 1998 für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Wiesbaden.
- Veen, H.-J. 1997. Innere Einheit – aber wo liegt sie? Eine Bestandsaufnahme im siebten Jahr nach der Wiedervereinigung. *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* B40-41: 19-28.
- Verwiebe, R. 1999. Soziale Ungleichheit und Gerechtigkeitsbewertungen sozialer Ungleichheit in Osteuropa. ISJP Technical Report no. 46, Berlin.
- Wagner, D. G., and J. Berger 1985. Do Sociological Theories Grow? *American Journal of Sociology* 90: 697-728.
- Walz, D., and W. Brunner 1997. Das Sein bestimmt das Bewußtsein. Oder: warum sich die Ostdeutschen als Bürger 2. Klasse fühlen. *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* B 51: 13-19.
- Weber, M. 1972. *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
- Weil, F. D. 1993. The Development of Democratic Attitudes in Eastern and Western Germany in a Comparative Per-

- spective. Pp. 195-225 in F. D. Weil (ed.), *Research on Democracy and Society* Vol. 1. Greenwich.
- Wegener, B. 1987. The Illusion of Distributive Justice. *European Sociological Review* 3: 1-13.
- Wegener, B. 1990. Equity, Relative Deprivation and the Value Consensus Paradox. *Social Justice Research* 4: 66-86.
- Wegener, B. 1992a. Concepts and Measurement of Prestige. *Annual Review of Sociology* 18: 253-80.
- Wegener, B. 1992b. Gerechtigkeitsforschung und Legitimationsnormen. *Zeitschrift für Soziologie* 21, 269-83.
- Wegener, B. 1999. Belohnungs- und Prinzipiengerechtigkeit. Die zwei Welten der empirischen Gerechtigkeitsforschung. Pp. 167-214 in U. Druwe and V. Kurz (eds.), *Politische Gerechtigkeit*. Opladen: Leske + Budrich.
- Wegener, B. 2000. Soziale Gerechtigkeit. To appear in: M. Greifenhagen and S. Greifenhagen (eds.), *Handwörterbuch zur politischen Kultur der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Wegener, B., and S. Liebig 1995a. Dominant Ideologies and the Variation of Distributive Justice Norms: A Comparison of East and West Germany, and the United States. Pp. 239-59 in J. Kluegel, D. Mason and B. Wegener (eds.), *Social Justice and Political Change: Public Opinion in Capitalist and Post-Communist States*. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
- Wegener, B., and S. Liebig 1995b. Hierarchical and Social Closure Conceptions of Distributive Social Justice: A Comparison of East and West Germany. Pp. 263-84 in J. Kluegel, D. Mason and B. Wegener (eds.), *Social Justice and Political Change: Public Opinion in Capitalist and Post-Communist States*. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
- Wegener, B., and S. Steinmann 1995. Justice Psychophysics in the Real World: Comparing Income Justice and Income Satisfaction in East and West Germany. Pp. 151-75 in J. Kluegel, D. Mason, and B. Wegener (eds.), *Social Justice and Political Change: Public Opinion in Capitalist and Post-Communist States*. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
- Wegener, B., and S. Liebig 1998. Gerechtigkeitsideologien 1991-1996. Pp. 25-60 in H. Meulemann (ed.), *Werte und nationale Identität im vereinten Deutschland. Erklärungsansätze der Umfrageforschung*. Opladen: Leske + Budrich.
- Wiesendahl, E. 1998. Der rot-grüne Wahlsieg. Eine Wahlnachlese und Analyse der neuen Machtverhältnisse. *Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte* 49: 753-64.
- Zapf, W., and R. Habich 1996. Die sich stabilisierende Transformation – ein deutscher Sonderweg. Pp. 329-50 in W. Zapf and R. Habich (eds.), *Die Wohlfahrtsentwicklung im vereinten Deutschland: Sozialstruktur, sozialer Wandel und Lebensqualität*. Berlin: Edition Sigma.